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Abstract 
 
The problem of cancer has long been an issue of vital importance to Canadians.    In an 
attempt to arrest the spread of cancer, radiation therapy emerged early in the 20th century 
as an effective tool in combating the disease and prompted a new hope that a cure for 
cancer would be realized in the not too distant future.  However, due to the expense of 
obtaining naturally occurring radioactive elements, radiation therapy was limited to a 
select group of patients.  The onset of the Great Depression further exposed the inability 
of patients to pay for treatment and led the Saskatchewan government to establish a 
cancer program that provided consultative, diagnostic and radiation therapy at a cost 
largely incurred by the state.  This thesis deals with the causative factors for the 
government to expand into the cancer care arena more than thirty years before the 
adoption of publicly funded universal health care.  It argues that the fuel to provide 
cancer care was as much a desire to benefit the sick as it was to building a recognizable 
identity for the province.  Legislators in Saskatchewan believed that they had a 
responsibility to mold an image for the province and ensuring that patients had access to 
increasingly specialized and technological treatments for cancer was a means through 
which the state could forge an identity as a progressive society dedicated to the health 
and well-being of its citizens.   
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Introduction: Historiography of Cancer Care in the Twentieth Century 
 
On June 25, 2010, Canwest News Service featured an article entitled “Health Care 
Here Ranked Second Worst."1 The study examined the effectiveness of medical facilities, 
average patient wait times and access to after hours care in seven industrialized nations.  
With Canada ranking only higher than the United States, the article highlighted the 
inadequacies with the provision of health care in Canada.  This was an extremely 
damaging revelation for a nation long proud of its universal health care system. It 
suggests that although insured citizens are entitled to receive treatment there was no 
guarantee that the subsequent care was either immediate or of good quality.  Assuming 
that timely and coordinated care are essential to providing for the best interests of the 
patient, the report demonstrated that there was an urgent need to re-evaluate the provision 
of health care in Canada.   
One component of the Canadian Health Care system that exhibits many of the 
problems described in this article is cancer care. As more than sixty-five percent of 
cancer patients awaiting radiation therapy were forced to incur delays in 2006 it is 
evident that there are serious flaws in how care is being provided to treat a time-sensitive 
disease that is now the leading cause of premature death in Canada.2 The problems have 
only been exacerbated since 2009 when Canada’s nuclear reactor in Chalk River, Ontario 
was shut down indefinitely.  As Chalk River had been producing more than a third of the 
                                                        1 Giuseppe Valiante, “Health Care here Ranked Second Worst,” Canwest News Article, 
June 25, 2010.  2 Charles Hayter, An Element of Hope: Radium and the Response to Cancer in Canada 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 3.  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world’s total supply of radioisotopes, its sudden closure further handcuffed the system’s 
ability to provide timely cancer care.3  
Amid these troubling revelations historian and oncologist Dr. Charles Hayter 
argued in his book, An Element of Hope, that many of the current problems in cancer care 
have foundations in the policies of the past.  Tracing the history of cancer programs in 
Canada from 1900 to the Second World War, Hayter demonstrates that these early 
endeavors formed the philosophical basis and structural organization of the system that 
remains in effect today.4 According to Hayter, this situation was problematic because 
there were deep schisms between the medical community and the state when establishing 
cancer initiatives.5 These conflicts led to compromises in the policies and practices, 
which Hayter contends, not only severely weakened the effectiveness of cancer programs 
but remained in effect despite obvious inefficiencies.6 Hayter’s hope in making this 
argument is to launch further scholarship into how the current problems facing cancer 
care are deeply rooted in the policies of the past.7  
The study here hopes to add another layer of analysis to the investigation by 
focusing on the history of cancer care in Saskatchewan.   Saskatchewan is an ideal case 
study to trace the development of cancer due to the fact that it was the first province to 
introduce a comprehensive cancer program beginning in December 1931.  Physicians 
Stuart C. Houston and David A.E. Shephard have both written on varying components of                                                         3 “Chalk River Reactor Idled to Late 2009 or Longer,” CBC News, July 8, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2009/07/08/chalk‐river‐nuclear‐reactor008.html (accessed September 7, 2009). 4 Hayter, 8.  5 Ibid., 111.  6 Ibid., 188.   7 Ibid., 8.  
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the Saskatchewan cancer control program. For instance, Houston provided a narrative of 
the accomplishments of the cancer endeavor, focusing primarily on the post-war period.   
Whereas, Shephard examined the first decade of care, 1929-1939, to consider how the 
strengths and weaknesses of the program were tied to the tenuous relationship between 
the government and physicians.  In using these works to construct a narrative for this 
study, but in not wanting to duplicate the story already uncovered by Hayter, Shephard, 
and Houston, this thesis shifts the focus from the role of physicians and the medical 
organization of cancer care to consider the motivating factors that encouraged the state to 
become involved in cancer control.    
International cancer historiography reveals that despite varying demographics, 
historians are united by a number of overlapping themes in their examinations of 
government involvement in cancer care. One recurring feature emphasized by historians 
is the role that public education played in formulating a response to the disease.  David 
Cantor, for instance, demonstrates the tremendous controversies that surrounded the 
educational message in the United States in an article entitled “Uncertain Enthusiasm.”  
Focusing on the medium of film, Cantor highlights how the public health message 
stressed the need for early detection and treatment, while also describing the significant 
technological advances that had been made for treating cancer.8 However, the fear in 
promoting the progress of science, according to the American Society for Cancer Control, 
was that if technology was over professed as being able to defeat this disease, then it 
                                                        8 David Cantor, “Uncertain Enthusiasm: The American Cancer Society, Public 
Education, and the Problems of the Movie, 1921-1960,” Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 81, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 40.    
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might inadvertently detract from the importance for the public to seek early treatment.9 
Consequently, while Cantor goes on to show that in the post-1944 era film became an 
indispensable part of public education for cancer control, in their early days cancer 
campaigns faced tremendous difficulties utilizing new forms of mass media to properly 
convey the problem that was cancer.   
A similar problem surrounding education is echoed by historian Ornella Moscucci 
in her examination of the British cancer efforts that arose in the early twentieth century.  
In her award winning article, The British Fight against Cancer: Publicity and Education, 
1900-1948 Moscucci considers how the campaign was riddled by the conflicting desire of 
educating the public about the cancer problem and the uncertainties about the efficacy of 
available therapies.  Fearing that public education may lead to increased anxiety and 
unrealistic expectations about the effectiveness of available treatments, British physicians 
simply did not want to create a demand that they were ill equipped to fulfill.10 As a result, 
education of the general public remained a low-key affair with teaching about the 
recognition of cancer directed solely at health professionals.  These two articles suggest 
that while there were stark differences in how education was utilized in Britain and 
America, historians have established that education played a pivotal role in shaping 
cancer efforts.   
In addition to focusing on education, international cancer historiography also 
reveals, that an increasing number of historians have considered the role of politics in 
launching cancer efforts around the world.  The shift to politics has emerged due to the                                                         9 Ibid., 41.   10 Ornella Moscucci, “The British Fight against Cancer: Publicity and Education, 1900-
1948,” Social History of Medicine 23, no. 2 (February 2009): 357.   
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fact that in many places governments not only sponsored, but also, initiated the cancer 
response.  To understand the state’s involvement in cancer care historians have tied 
cancer efforts to their contextual surroundings. Historian Patrice Pinell demonstrates the 
importance of context in his work, which centers on France.  Employing a social 
historical approach, Pinell examined how the First World War redefined the role of the 
state to provide for its citizens.  With the disease being held as a serious scourge on 
society, cancer became identified as a political issue that required state intervention to 
ensure the ability of patients to obtain cancer services.     
Concurrent with the growing focus on the political history of cancer care, the 
notion of nation building has received significant attention from historians as a causative 
factor for the growing involvement of government in cancer care. Robert Proctor 
illustrates this in his work entitled The Nazi War on Cancer as he surveys the cancer 
effort launched in the 1930s in the name of National Socialism. As the Nazi’s sought to 
construct an Aryan race composed of racially worthy Germans, cancer was considered a 
serious impediment to this objective and declared “the number one enemy of the 
state.”11Furthermore, the German cancer campaign became associated with the Nazi 
desire to eliminate undesirables, such as individuals of Jewish heritage, who were not 
only seen as the purveyors of cancer but also considered a “tumor within the German 
body” who, like cancer, were viewed as a serious threat to German society.12 While the 
Nazi cancer campaign is an extreme example of how treatment for the disease was tied to 
                                                        11 Robert Proctor, The Nazi War on Cancer (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2000), 68.  12 Ibid.  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a process of nation building, Proctor’s work reinforces the historiographical importance 
of understanding the social and political context of cancer efforts.   
Another historian demonstrating the importance of societal context and politics in 
cancer’s history is Angela Creager.  In particular, the influence that American politics 
had in shaping cancer therapies in a domestic setting, and abroad.  Tracing the growth of 
the artificial radioisotope industry after mastering the power of the atom, Creager 
highlights the political debates that emerged in determining whether this technology 
should be shared with foreign nations.  Politicians feared that making radioisotopes 
available to scientists in other countries “might speed the development of atomic 
weaponry elsewhere.”13 This position was eventually overcome when President Truman 
announced on September 3, 1947 at the opening of the Fourth Annual International 
Cancer Research Congress that the United States’ radioisotopes would be available to 
foreign scientists.  It nonetheless reinforces the extent that politics has had in shaping 
cancer practices.14 
The focus on government involvement in cancer care, however, is not an 
approach employed by all historians writing about cancer. Barbara Clow, for instance, 
studied the therapies offered by unconventional practitioners to cancer patients in Canada 
in the first half of the twentieth century.  A number of alternative healers professed 
serums, enzymes and herbal tea concoctions as remedies that could cure cancer.15  
                                                        13 Angela Creager, “Tracing the politics of changing postwar research practices: the 
export of ‘American’ radioisotopes to European biologists,” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (2002): 376. 14 Ibid.   15 Barbara Clow, Negotiating Disease (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2001), 85.  
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Addressing the popularity of such treatments Clow established that they posed a serious 
challenge to the authority of conventional medicine.  While Clow’s study highlights 
another component of cancer’s historiography it is not in keeping with the investigation 
being undertaken here since one of the reasons the Saskatchewan cancer program was 
launched was to reinforce what constituted legitimate medicine.   
Another branch of the historiography considers the long-standing consequences 
that politics have had in hindering cancer care.  An additional work by Proctor entitled, 
Cancer Wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know and Don’t Know demonstrates this 
growing trend.  Proctor argues that in America an ever-expanding bureaucracy has 
detracted from achieving the desired intent of decreasing the mortality rates of cancer.  
He supports this claim through considering the nominal improvements that have been 
made in defeating cancer since President Richard Nixon declared “War on the Disease” 
in 1971.  Despite Nixon’s pronouncement sparking an investment of over twenty five 
billion dollars in research by the National Cancer Institute, Proctor shows that cancer 
patients (i.e. lung, colon, and prostate cancer) surviving over five years has only 
increased from forty-nine to fifty-three percent.16 Proctor traces the source of these dismal 
results through the political history of cancer care, as subsequent administrations in 
America did not share Nixon’s sentiment towards defeating the cancer problem.  For 
instance, examining the many-anti-environmental actions of the Reagan-Bush 
administrations, Proctor documents the growing rhetoric in this era that downplayed the 
                                                        16 Robert Proctor, Cancer Wars: How Politics Shapes What We Know and Don’t Know 
About Cancer (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 4.  
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dangers of manmade carcinogens and minimized the environmental threat of cancer.17 As 
this belief delayed the greater regulation of carcinogens, Proctor argues that the causation 
of the disease has become a highly politicized topic.18 Meaning, that the very definition of 
cancer transcends medical interpretation.   
In addition to establishing how politics have shaped perceptions of the disease, 
other historians have considered how politics have influenced the types of treatment 
practiced in America. Historian Ilana Löwy argued in her book Preventive Strikes: 
Women, Precancer and Prophylactic Surgery that the lack of state support in America 
has inadvertently resulted in insurance companies dictating the types of cancer treatments 
available.  She concentrates on breast cancer and reveals that insurance companies have 
used the Breast Cancer gene (BRCA) to direct the treatments available to patients. It is 
important to note that a positive test for the BRCA gene is not an indication that a woman 
has, or is definitely going to contract cancer.  Rather, it merely suggests that she is at an 
increased risk of acquiring breast cancer at some point in her life compared to a woman 
who is not a carrier for the gene. Löwy then demonstrates that in the case of a positive 
BRCA test, where a woman has yet to contract the disease, insurance companies would 
only provide coverage for women who opt to undergo a bilateral mastectomy followed by 
reconstructive surgery.19  The justification for this invasive surgery is that the cost of 
prophylactic action is far cheaper than supporting a long-drawn out battle with cancer. As 
the rate of prophylactic surgeries occur at a far higher frequency in America than 
                                                        17 Ibid., 6.  18 Ibid., 14.  19 Ilana Löwy, Preventive Strikes: Women, Precancer and Prophylactic Surgery 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 204.   
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anywhere else in the world, it is evident that the lack of a state presence in health 
insurance has had an enormous impact in shaping cancer care practices in the U.S. 20  
When these studies are considered together a unified historiographical narrative 
emerges regarding the important role that states have had in shaping cancer efforts. To be 
clear, a number of scholars have examined the origin and development of the welfare 
state that emerged in Saskatchewan.  David E. Smith, for instance, traced the growth of 
the Liberal party in Saskatchewan and how their policies resulted in a recurring theme of 
partisan politics.21 Seymour Lipset employed a similar examination on partisanship 
proposing that the emergence of socialist ideals was a direct result of the overwhelmingly 
rural population.22 As Saskatchewan lacked powerful urban centers early in the 20th 
century, Lipset argued that it was the collectivist ideals, which emerged as a byproduct of 
farmers’ day-to-day experiences that proved instrumental in the promotion of the welfare 
state by the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).23 In contrast to Lipset, 
Nelson Wiseman argued that it was not agrarian values that rooted social democracy in 
the province but rather the high number of British, continental Europeans and Catholics 
who called Saskatchewan home.24 As a consequence, it was the unique demographics of 
Saskatchewan that proved instrumental in the rise of social democracy as votes from 
                                                        20 Ibid.  21 David E. Smith, Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan 1905-1971 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 324.   22 Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth 
Federation in Saskatchewan (California: University of California Press, 1950), 50.  23 Ibid., 69. 24 Nelson Wiseman, In Search of Canadian Political Culture (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2007), 223.   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these constituencies represented the swing factor in elections fought between the Liberals 
and the CCF.25  
 While the aforementioned works provide various theories on the development of 
partisan politics in Saskatchewan the cancer story suggests a political commitment that 
transcends party lines.  This finding suggests that there are certain fundamental rights that 
will be supported by the state, regardless of political affiliation.  Therefore, this thesis 
adds to the historiography by providing a new perspective for understanding the state’s 
involvement in cancer services through examining the cancer initiative through the Social 
Contract Theory.    
The most commonly recognized proponents of Social Contract theory are John 
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. Considering that these philosophers 
lived in different time periods and cultural conditions it is understandable that they had 
varying ideas as to what structure government should take. For instance, Locke professed 
a faith in a decentralized government whereas Rousseau argued for a strong and direct 
form of democracy.26  In spite of these differences, they all embraced the same basic 
premise that because the governing authority depends on some degree of the consent of 
the people, that the state has a responsibility to ensure the continued functioning of 
society. 27      
                                                        25 Ibid., 224.  26 Christopher Bertram, Rousseau and The Social Contract (New York: Routledge Taylor 
and Francis Group, 2004), 107. 27 Note: this is a gross simplification of the deeply developed ideas that Locke, Rousseau, 
and Hobbes put forth on the Social Contract.  Greater detail is not considered here 
because this thesis is not concerned with interrogating what their beliefs were but rather 
to draw attention to their premise that the government provides the conditions for a stable 
society.   
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A 20th century re-interpretation of the social contract by Harvard philosopher John 
Rawls entitled, A Theory of Justice, took to a higher level of abstraction the theories to 
argue that it is not enough for a society to be satisfied with maximizing the benefit of the 
majority. The reason being, that acting strictly under those terms it would, ultimately, 
result in the position of some segment of society being sacrificed.  Rawls’ argues that we 
are all citizens within a liberal society and the government must satisfy the demands of 
both freedom and equality for all individuals.28 Rawls’ focus, therefore, is to describe a 
just arrangement of the major political and social institutions of a liberal society, since he 
considered the arrangement of these institutions the basic structure of society.29 He does 
so because he maintains that it is these institutions that distribute the main benefits of 
social life and will have the most profound effects on the lives of citizens, influencing not 
only their prospects, but also their goals.   
In order to achieve a social contract that equally and fairly distributes the 
advantages of social cooperation, Rawls argues that the management of institutions must 
adhere to two guiding principles.  First, each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all. 30 The first principle is therefore to be used for ensuring political righteousness, 
that is, that citizens have the same basic rights to civil liberties.  Examples include, the 
right to vote, freedom of speech and assembly, freedom of thought, and freedom of the 
                                                        28 Note: Rawls terms his version of the social contract “Justice as Fairness.”  For 
consistency and clarity it will be referred to for the rest of this thesis as Rawls’ Social 
Contract.   29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), 7. 30 Ibid., 266.  
  
12 
person along with the right to hold personal property.31  Rawls assumes that these 
liberties are required to be equal under the first principle because citizens of a just society 
are required to have the same basic rights.32 
The second principle, which was intentionally placed by Rawls in a serial order, 
holds that inequalities in the distribution of goods are permissible only if these 
inequalities benefit the least advantaged members of society.33 The second principle was 
designed to apply to primarily social and economic institutions as a means to overcome 
the natural divisions that arise with social cooperation. Rawls arrived at this conclusion as 
a result of the realization that each person finds themselves born into a particular position 
in society that will materially affect their life prospects.34 While he is not suggesting that 
the distribution of wealth and income be equal, he does suggest that it be to everyone’s 
advantage.  According to Rawls this level of equality can be achieved if institutions are 
set up to improve the situation of the less favoured as they will then improve the lot of 
citizens in general.35 However, with respect to health care services, Rawls reasoned that 
because we all have physical needs and psychological capacities within the normal range, 
then there could be no inequality in access to health care services.36 
In describing a theoretical framework as to how a fair and just society could 
equally distribute the benefits of institutions to all citizens, Rawls understood society as a 
venture of cooperation for mutual benefit.  However, Rawls assumes that the government 
                                                        31 Ibid., 61.  32 Ibid. 33 Ibid., 266.  34 Ibid., 12.   35 Ibid., 71.   36 Ibid., 83.  
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must act in this way because this is, in essence, the very responsibility of the state.  As 
people come together in a society to grant power of authority to a government it is in turn 
the sovereign’s responsibility in a democratic state to arrange an ideal environment that 
treats all people as free and equal citizens and creates the opportunity for them to further 
their own means.37  
As such, with Rawls’ argument that the state must provide the ideal conditions to 
benefit the whole population, the state sponsored cancer program launched in 
Saskatchewan embodied many of the characteristics inherent in Rawls’ social contract.  
As Saskatchewan developed a cancer model in 1931 that provided all citizens, regardless 
of their ability to pay, the right to receive cancer treatment, this was a society adhering to 
a guideline that its population needed to be treated as fair and equal citizens. Yet, while 
this ideology overlaps with Rawls’ social contract theory, further interrogation of the 
cancer endeavor reveals a contradiction with his theory.  Although the program satisfied 
the primary condition of overcoming utilitarian ideals, as it was available to all citizens, it 
is clear that the state was not just acting to provide for its citizens.  Rather, there was an 
interest to the state itself for undertaking this endeavor.   
The benefit to the province for providing cancer services stemmed from the fact 
that this was a means through which the province could forge a recognizable identity for 
itself.  The government’s realization that it had a responsibility, arguably more so than 
any other province in Canada, to construct their own provincial image, stemmed from the 
lack of a historical or linguistic continuity in its diverse population.  Subsequently, the 
provision of cancer services that was both scientific and technologically advanced was a                                                         37 Ibid., 11.  
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means by which Saskatchewan could gain recognition and prestige.  Tracing the course 
of cancer care’s development over a thirty-year period, from 1931 to 1967, this thesis 
considers how subsequent governments remained dedicated to providing cancer services 
in an attempt to solidify a Saskatchewan identity.  Moreover, that the desire to succeed in 
affirming an identity for the province, resulted in a continued commitment to renegotiate 
and improve upon the provision of cancer services that culminated with Saskatchewan 
becoming a world leader in the fight against cancer.   
Cancer care, in this regard, can be understood as an ideal endeavor for pursuing a 
provincial identity given the societal context in which it was launched in 1931.  As cancer 
was a disease for which there was no cure, the realization that it was a disease that could 
affect all ages, sexes, classes and races suggested that cancer posed a serious threat to the 
very fabric of society.  Unlike tuberculosis (TB) and mental illness, which were often 
associated with the urban poor and “Indians,” cancer was a disease for which there were 
no social boundaries.  This meant that unlike other health issues there was initially no 
particular social stigma attached to cancer.  The universality of the disease was therefore 
a major distinction between it and other major public health campaigns.  Furthermore, the 
cancer problem was heightened due to the tremendous cost associated with receiving 
treatment.  Owing to the increasingly specialized equipment required to treat the disease, 
being the first in Canada to ignite a comprehensive program that would enable all of its 
citizens to access care, regardless of their ability to pay, suggested that Saskatchewan was 
a province dedicated to overruling the contingencies of nature.   
To be clear, realizing that there was a motivation to the state that extended beyond 
the benefit to the citizen is by no means meant to detract from Rawls’ social contract.  In 
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actuality, the study here hopes to build on his framework of a fair and just society to 
show that it is only to be expected that there should be a returned benefit to the state, as 
governments are comprised of people, who are just as fallible and wanting as the people 
they govern.  Moreover, in tracing how there is a returned benefit to the state it reveals 
not only how this situation results in a continued ideal condition that provides for the best 
interest of the citizen but furthermore shows how this arrangement results in the 
establishment of a legacy whereby subsequent administrations remain dedicated to 
sustaining a particular service.   
The realization that there was a reciprocal benefit to the province for providing 
cancer services inevitably shaped the types of primary sources examined in this thesis. In 
attempting to understand the “official mind” of the government, this study relied heavily 
on primary sources documenting legislative proceedings.38 In particular, the 
Saskatchewan Journals of Legislative Assembly as well as the Legislative Scrapbooks 
from the Regina Daily Star were instrumental in providing perspective on the state’s 
motivation to provide cancer services in Saskatchewan.  The material in these sources 
documented the speeches, bills, debates and concerns that were raised in the Legislative 
Assembly on an annual basis.  Because these sources highlight the political impetus of 
the state’s involvement in cancer care they can be used to extrapolate the advantages to 
the government for providing cancer services.   
This study also focuses on evidence that attempted to garner attention for 
Saskatchewan. For instance, speeches describing Saskatchewan’s intent to lead the way 
                                                        38 Ronald Edward Robinson, John Gallagher and Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: 
the Official Mind of Imperialism (London: Macmillan, 1961), 25.    
  
16 
in Canada, and how the province could be depended upon by western nations to supply 
cancer therapies are instances of the types of evidence used to understand the province’s 
motivation.  The use of external accolades by politicians to describe the success of 
Saskatchewan’s cancer initiative was another thread used to confirm the continued desire 
to solidify an image for the province. 
These sources are not an inclusive representation of the documentation used to 
compile this thesis.  Supplementary primary sources from newspapers, such as the New 
York Times, were useful for demonstrating the emergence of a culture of cancer.  While 
the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ) proved pivotal for understanding the 
continued expansion of the state’s involvement in cancer care in the post-war years and 
the response from the medical community.  A long-list of secondary sources 
contextualized the expansion of the welfare state on both the provincial and federal level 
and provided additional support for understanding the renegotiation of the relationship 
that existed between the state and its people.   
 Consequently, in adhering to Rawls’ social contract theory that society is a 
scheme of cooperation for mutual benefit, this thesis will expand on this argument to 
establish that the state also benefited from the provision of cancer services as a result of 
being able to forge an identity for itself.  The first chapter provides the background and 
context of the factors that drove the need for a provincial cancer program in 
Saskatchewan.  Specifically, it looks at how rising cancer mortalities combined with 
deteriorating economic conditions, on account of the depression in the 1930s, exposed the 
government’s need to reconsider its responsibility to its citizens.  The second chapter 
traces the development and expansion of the cancer initiative amidst an unstable political 
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and socio-economic climate, as subsequent administrations remained dedicated to 
improving and expanding cancer services.  The third chapter explores the expansion of 
cancer care concurrent with the introduction of new technologies and the associated shift 
to the federal government in securing treatment services.  Chapter three argues once 
again that the forces driving cancer care at the provincial level were characteristic of the 
dominion’s increasing involvement in cancer care in the post-war era.  Meaning, that the 
decision to embark on the provision of cancer services was as much a desire to benefit the 
citizen, as it was a self-serving desire to benefit the state.   
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Chapter One:  The Origin of Cancer Care in Saskatchewan &  
     The Building of a Province  
 
 
In the early twentieth century the threat of cancer was a rarely mentioned subject 
in Saskatchewan.  As provincial health campaigns primarily centered on the construction 
of hospitals, tuberculosis and mental health reforms it was not until the end of 1929 that 
cancer became identified as a problem that could no longer be ignored.  Sparked by 
concern that both the incidences and mortality rate of cancer were on the rise, the medical 
profession and the state united to formulate a response to this increasing threat.39  
Receiving the full endorsement of the Canadian Medical Association, the state introduced 
an ambitious cancer campaign to provide consultative, diagnostic and radiation therapy at 
a subsidized cost.  With the first patient receiving treatment in December 1931 the 
initiative sought to ensure that any resident of Saskatchewan requiring cancer care would 
not be deterred by their inability to pay.40  Providing this service more than thirty years 
before the adoption of Universal Health Care, this is an early example of a Canadian 
province re-examining its responsibility to provide for the health and well being of its 
citizens.   
Rawls’ social contract theory sheds light on the government’s decision to embark 
on this endeavor.  As Rawls argues the state has a responsibility to provide services that 
benefit all members of society.  This thesis takes that assumption and further contends 
that there must also be a reciprocal benefit to the state to sustain the social contract.  In 
tracing the origin of the cancer initiative it became apparent that the state also benefited                                                         39 Hayter, 90.  40 Ibid., 102.  
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because establishing a cancer program also aided in building a provincial identity.  This 
chapter argues, therefore, that the state used the cancer services program as a means of 
forging a recognizable identity for the province.  The goal being, to project an image of 
Saskatchewan as a communal and progressive society dedicated to the health and well 
being of its citizens.   
Although writings on cancer date back to Hippocrates, it was only at the turn of 
the twentieth century that a fear emerged amongst medical professionals that the 
incidences of cancer were on the rise around the world.41 The reason for the sudden 
identification of cancer as a problem was likely precipitated by a number of changing 
societal conditions.  For instance, by the end of the nineteenth century tremendous 
improvements had been made in public sanitation and in treating infectious diseases.42 As 
a result, people were simply living longer, which resulted in the impact of chronic 
diseases, like cancer, appearing that much more profoundly in the general population.   
The increased incidence of the disease proved to be an extremely troubling 
revelation for physicians due to the fact that not only was the origin of cancer’s cause 
elusive but also because there was no consensus on an effective means of treatment.  
Surgery had often been employed throughout the 1800s as a means to eradicate tumors, 
but uncertainties surrounded the efficacy of operations due to the high percentage of 
recurrences to which many patients eventually succumbed.43 As such, the rising rates of 
                                                        41 Devra Davis, The Secret History of the War on Cancer (New York: Basic Books, 
2007), 4.  42 Kant Patel and Mark E Rushefsky, Health Care Policy in an Age of New Technologies 
(New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 3. 
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cancer combined with the inefficiencies in treating the disease led physicians to believe 
that cancer posed a serious threat to societies around the world.   
Coincidentally, while doubts persisted over the curability of cancer through 
operable means, a new treatment option emerged from the lab of Marie and Pierre Curie.  
Marie, a Parisian educated physicist and chemist, had been working with her husband on 
possible fields of research for her thesis.44 Intrigued by Henri Becquerel’s discovery of 
natural radioactivity in 1896, Curie set out to investigate the energy emitted by uranium 
in greater detail.  However, Marie disputed Becquerel’s hypothesis that radiation was the 
outcome of some interaction between molecules.45 The reason being that the activity of 
uranium compounds appeared to vary depending on the quantity of uranium present.  In 
the search to support her theory Curie identified two new radioactive elements, which she 
named Polonium and Radium.  As these elements displayed varying activities of 
radiation, which supported Curie’s theory, she presented her research to the French 
Academy of Sciences on the 12th of April 1898.46  
The publication of her research ignited widespread interest among scientists who 
sought to better understand the properties and potential of radioactivity.  Thomas Edison, 
Max Planck and Nikola Tesla are but a sample of the scientists who turned their attention 
to radioactive materials.47 However, since the deleterious effects of radiation exposure 
were not yet understood researchers did not take the necessary precautions to protect 
themselves and subsequently, encountered significant health problems.  Thomas Edison, 
for instance, nearly blinded himself and almost killed his research assistant on account of  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45 Ibid. 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radiation exposure.48 Yet, with experiments like Edison’s revealing that exposure to 
radiation damaged tissues and cells, ideas emerged about the possibility of applying 
radiation therapeutically against tumorous growths.    
These ideas were quickly put into practice after the turn of the twentieth century 
and radiation therapy became increasingly employed and recognized, as an effective tool 
against cancer. In a July 1903 article from the New York Times, radium was heralded as 
“A Cancer Cure” on account of the “astonishing results obtained in the case of a patient 
whose condition apparently was hopeless.”49 A subsequent article from December of the 
same year reiterated this sentiment touting radium as “the unmistakable cure for cancer” 
due to a long-standing cancer case being cured by radium rays in Vienna.50 These 
findings were repeated by institutions around the world, as the effectiveness of radiation 
therapy in defeating cancer appeared undeniable. Many researchers felt that the 
application of radiation therapy, in combination with surgery, could produce a cure for 
cancer in the not too distant future. 
In an effort to expedite the realization of a cure, the first international conference 
on cancer was held in Heidelberg, Germany in 1906 under the auspices of the German 
cancer committee.51 Attended by representatives from England, France and the United 
States, members debated questions surrounding research methods, the efficacy of 
treatment by both surgery and radiation, and the necessity of maintaining vital statistics.  
                                                        48 Matthew Josephson, Edison: A Biography (Toronto: MacGraw-Hill Book Company 
Inc, 1959), 383.  49 “Radium As A Cancer Cure,” New York Times, July 4, 1904.  50 “Cancer Cured By Radium,” New York Times, December 31, 1903.  51 “The International Cancer Conference at Paris,” Nature 84, no. 2139 (October 1910):  
545. 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Furthermore, out of the conference developed the International Association for the Study 
and Suppression of Cancer, which they modeled after the successful endeavors that had 
been taken against T.B.  As tremendous improvements had been made in the survivability 
of patients with T.B. the collection of doctors at the Heidelberg Conference set out to do 
what their peers had done to T.B.52    
The success of the Heidelberg Conference warranted a second meeting in Paris 
only two years later.  Attendance expanded to one hundred and fifty delegates from over 
twenty countries as cancer grew to receive ever-increasing attention. The result of the 
conference was an increased awareness among doctors about the need for early diagnosis 
and immediate treatment.53 However, this realization exposed a significant hurdle in that 
physicians seeking to provide radiotherapy encountered a common problem with the 
extreme expense of obtaining radium as a source of radioactivity.  The high cost stemmed 
from the fact that the acquisition of naturally occurring radioactive material was very 
labour intensive.  Consequently, private physicians were constrained in their ability to 
obtain sufficient amounts of radium to effectively treat patients. 
In an attempt to overcome the cost hurdle a variety of responses emerged around 
the world.  In the United States, for example, a small group of private physicians 
interested in providing radiotherapy united to formulate a response.  This move was 
instigated largely by Dr. James Douglas who had lost a daughter to cancer in 1906.  
Douglas believed that while his daughter’s case was beyond saving, her condition had 
improved so much from treatment with radium that, following her death, he devoted his 
                                                        52 Ibid. 53 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efforts to securing this therapy for all cancer sufferers.54 As a result, Douglas along with a 
couple of partners contributed a hundred and fifty thousand dollars of their own money to 
pay the expenses for organizing a National Radium Institute (NRI).55 The establishment 
of the NRI not only ensured that the cost of acquiring radium would be paid for but, 
furthermore, that hospitals in New York and Baltimore would freely provide radium 
therapy to all cancer patients.56  
In contrast with the cancer effort in America, European nations derived support 
for cancer initiatives from the state.  France, for example, saw the need to reform its 
health care system in the immediate aftermath of the First World War.57 The war had 
exposed the need for the state to provide specific services deemed essential to public 
health and cancer was identified as one such condition in the post-war period. 
Consequently, centralized cancer centers were established in highly specialized institutes 
whereby services, such as radiation therapy, could be delivered at the expense of the 
state.58 In short, efforts like the French one exposed how the need to treat cancer 
universally ignited reforms and adaptations to an antiquated approach of providing health 
care that focused on an individual’s ability to pay.   
Concurrent with the health care reforms in America and France, Canada was also 
re-evaluating its provision of health services at the beginning of the twentieth century. As 
hospitals had previously been seen as a charnel house for the sick poor, advances in 
diagnostic efficacy, technological innovation and surgical accomplishment that could                                                         54 “Scientists’ Eyes on Radium Tests,” New York Times, December 28, 1913. 55 Ibid.  56 Ibid.  57 Patrice Pinell, The Fight Against Cancer (New York: Routledge, 2002), xvi.  58 Ibid.  
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only be provided in highly specialized centers spurred a new perception of the hospital.59 
Casting off its Victorian identity the hospital took on a redefined image as an institution 
to provide health care for all social classes.60 Although this transition also resulted in the 
hospital becoming a two-class institution, as better treatment of the rich was used as a 
means to generate revenue, it nonetheless facilitated a “wholesale transfer of the care and 
treatment of the sick from the home to the hospital” between 1890 and 1920.61  
Medical technology played a major role in rebranding the hospital and appealing 
to the modern middle-class patient. Yet, amid this transformation radium therapy, 
initially, was not a part of this medical revolution.  A possible explanation for the lack of 
a coordinated cancer effort, in comparison to America and France, is that doctors in 
Canada were far more subdued in their assessment of the possible impact that radium had 
for cancer. For example, a 1909 article in the Canadian Practitioner reported on Dr. 
Edmund E. King’s favorable results in the use of radium treatment for cancer of the 
tongue.  However, while praising the improvement, King was careful to note that this was 
in no way a cure, but rather, a means for improving the condition of the cancer patient. 62 
This sentiment was echoed by the, albeit small, community of physicians in 
Canada working with radium.  A supplementary article in the Canadian Practitioner 
entitled “Radium in the Treatment of Malignant Growths” conveyed how Canadian 
doctors believed that radium would never displace surgery, but rather, would best be used                                                         59 David Gagan and Rosemary Gagan, For Patients of Moderate Means: A Social History 
of the Voluntary Public General Hospital in Canada, 1890-1950 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002), 6.  60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., 3.  62 Edmund E. King, “Cancer of Tongue – Radium Treatment,” Canadian Practitioner 
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in combination with surgery to destroy neoplastic cells.63 Furthermore, the article 
hypothesized that radium would not be effective against all types of cancers, claiming, 
“that to think so would be ridiculous.”64 With Canadian physicians being far more 
reluctant than their global counterparts in accepting radium as an all-encompassing cure 
for cancer, this perception likely contributed to why Canada lagged behind the rest of the 
world in formulating an initial response to the cancer problem with radium at the 
forefront.   
It was not until after the First World War that Canadian physicians organized to 
provide radiotherapy for cancer patients.  Although radiotherapy was still not being 
heralded as a cure in Canada, it was at this time more widely accepted as an effective 
means to treat cancer.  This newfound opinion first appeared in Quebec as an initiative 
was launched to subsidize the purchase of radium for cancer care in 1922.65 The Victoria 
General Hospital in Halifax, Nova Scotia followed suit in 1925, becoming the first 
institution in English Canada to embark on a formal cancer crusade.66 However, while 
these two efforts marked the beginning of cancer programs in Canada, they were not 
indicative of cancer practices throughout the nation.        
Most of the county remained reluctant to recognize cancer as a problem that 
required immediate attention.  In Saskatchewan, for example, when doctor’s suggested in 
1922 that the government should purchase radium for cancer therapy, the reception was 
not exactly welcoming.  Premier C.A. Dunning denounced the plan to purchase radium                                                         63 N.S. Finzi, “Radium in the Treatment of Malignant Growths,” Canadian Practitioner, 
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due to the fact that, in his opinion, there was no evidence of its benefits.  Furthermore, 
Dunning believed that there were far more pressing health issues, such as TB, to deal 
with.67 This mentality was repeated in an editorial from the Saskatoon Daily Star, which 
called radium “a plaything, a bauble, that puts hope in the minds of cancer sufferers that 
this technology would provide a magical cure.”68 The author goes further in supporting 
this claim by arguing that the radium craze was fabricated by medical professionals in an 
attempt to increase profits.69 Because the cancer scare was perceived to be a fictitious 
anomaly conjured by doctors and clerics, the premier refused to be duped into allowing 
mountebanks to have undue influence over public policy.   
However, by the end of the 1920s cancer was a concern that could no longer be 
ignored in Saskatchewan.  Initiated by the Saskatchewan Medical Association in 
November 1929, a cancer committee was struck to determine whether the government 
purchase of radium was a worthwhile endeavor.70 Arriving at a conclusion in only two 
months, the committee proposed seven recommendations to the government: 1) institute a 
provincial program for the study and treatment of cancer; 2) establish two treatment 
centers equipped with radium; 3) purchase 1.5 grams of radium, which would be 
distributed among the two centers and a central emanation plant; 4) form a Canadian 
Society for the Control of Cancer; 5) institute a program of public education about cancer 
through the medical profession and the Department of Public Health; 6) organize medical 
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cancer conferences for joint study of cases and the collection of scientific data; and 7) 
organize cancer conferences at the discretion of the secretary of the SMA.71 
In an attempt to instill these reforms, Dr. Earle Shepley of Saskatoon proved to be 
“influential in the negotiations between the medical profession and the government.”72 
Shepley wrote numerous letters to the Minister of Health, Dr. Frederick Dennis Munroe, 
during the winter of 1929-1930 outlining the intentions of the cancer committee.73 The 
Minister’s reaction to the report proved extremely prescient for the future development of 
healthcare in the province, as Munroe believed that the committee’s recommendations 
were not enough.  The reason being that while the government purchase of radium would 
help to subsidize the cost incurred by the patients, they would still ultimately be 
responsible for the payments of treatments. To circumvent this situation, the Minister 
wanted to expand on the committee’s recommendations and planned to institute a 
comprehensive cancer program that would provide consultative, diagnostic and radiation 
therapy at an expense largely incurred by the state.74 
In making this declaration of intent, Munroe was fully aware, likely as a result of 
being a physician himself, that doctor’s might feel uneasy about the state’s intrusion into 
health care.75 In an attempt to first gauge the support of the profession, Munroe submitted 
a draft of the legislation to the president of the Canadian Medical Association, Dr. A.T.  
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Bazin of Montreal.76 The letter stated that the legislation was not intended to give free  
treatment, it was simply a means to provide specific services that would be limited to 
diagnosis, consultation and radiation therapy for patients, for which doctors would be 
compensated.77 To Munroe’s surprise, Bazin’s reply was both congratulatory and 
supportive, and provided the Minister with the confidence to introduce the legislation for 
the establishment of a permanent cancer commission in Saskatchewan on the 14th of 
February, 1930.   
During the second reading of the Bill, which occurred just over a month later on 
March 17th, Munroe went into far greater detail to describe not only what the cancer 
problem entailed, but also, why it merited the involvement of the state. Defining cancer 
as an uncontrolled growth of certain tissues of the body, Munroe expressed concern over 
the fact that medical science had yet to determine the true cause of the disease.78 The 
inability to understand cancer’s etiology was further complicated by reports of the 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, which revealed that from 1905 to 1928 the provincial 
death rate had risen from 8.8 to 55.2 per one hundred thousand people.79 However, 
despite this alarming climb, when compared to the rest of the country Saskatchewan 
actually had the lowest incidence of cancer in the dominion.  Munroe justified these 
findings by considering the age distribution of the population.  As cancer was proving to 
                                                        76 Ibid. 77 Ibid.  78 Saskatchewan Journals and Sessional Papers 1929 and 1930, Journals of the 
Legislative Assembly of the Province of Saskatchewan, Volume XXVII (Session 1929), 
419, Minister of Public Health F.D. Munroe, Speech on the Second Reading of An Act to 
Provide for the Establishment of a Permanent Cancer Commission. Monday March 17, 
1930.   79 Ibid., 420. 
  
29 
be a disease that largely targeted adults between the ages of fifty to seventy-nine, it was 
understandable that the frequency of cancer deaths was lower in Saskatchewan because 
its population comprised a mean age that was far below the national average.80 From this 
interpretation Munroe reasoned that if action was not taken immediately, then cancer 
posed a problem that was going to become increasingly severe in upcoming decades.81 As 
a consequence of its comparatively low rates, Munroe believed that the province was in a 
unique position to take pre-emptive action against the disease.   
Munroe identified a number of hurdles that needed to be overcome in an attempt 
to alleviate the cancer burden of future generations.  The first was that since physicians 
did not understand the causation of cancer they had to be experts in identifying the early 
stages of the disease. 82  Munroe held that improvements in the diagnosis of cancer could 
be obtained through the coordination and centralization of facilities available to all 
citizens of the province.  This arrangement would, ultimately, concentrate cancer patients 
in a single facility, which Munroe believed would be a benefit to the cancer cause 
because “the more cases of a disease a physician has contact with, the more expert he 
becomes in its treatment.”83 
The second problem that Munroe identified as a serious hindrance to the efficacy 
of centralized cancer facilities was that patients had to report to them before the onset of 
the disease had become difficult, if not impossible, to treat.  He argued that individuals 
delayed in consulting medical advice because the general public was unaware of the 
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deceptive and insidious symptoms of early internal cancers.84  For this reason Munroe 
placed a great emphasis on the need for lay education.  This point was illustrated in his 
address to the legislature where he proclaimed “that this aspect (education) shall receive 
constant and persistent attention, because, no matter how efficient the methods of 
treatment, if patients do not seek early advice and examination, and are not prepared to 
accept the information given them, we can hope to accomplish very little.”85 
Finally, in addition to documenting the importance of education and diagnosis in 
the proposed comprehensive cancer program the minister also addressed the type of 
treatment to be provided in the clinics.  Citing the success of government-supported 
cancer programs in Sweden, Norway, Britain and Massachusetts, Munroe drew concerted 
attention to their shared devotion to radiation therapy.  Munroe noted how these nations 
purchased radium as a means to overcome the prohibitive cost to the individual 
physician.  He then stressed how through the application of radium therapy these states 
had obtained excellent results in treating the disease with cure rates, in some forms of 
cancer, equaling those of surgery.86 Munroe saw the success of these programs as 
justification for the province to embark on a similar scheme of cooperation whereby up to 
$115 000 of the state’s budget would be directed towards the purchase of one-half gram 
of radium for cancer therapy.87 
Munroe also placed a strong emphasis on the fact that the service should not be 
provided free of charge.  The intent of the charge was to avoid the appearance of a 
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charitable experience, which Munroe reasoned would undermine the value of the 
initiative.88 This perception stemmed from the idea that Saskatchewan residents were a 
hard working, laborious people who were simply not used to receiving handouts. 
Saskatchewan historian Bill Waiser has argued that prior to the depression the attitude 
persisted that a healthy person without a job must have been simply lazy.89 Work was 
assumed to be always available, whether on the farm or elsewhere, for anyone who truly 
needed it.90 Although this belief was called into question during the depression, as even 
the healthiest of men were unable to find work to support their families, people were 
often still rooted in a pre-depression mindset about receiving social assistance.91 
Therefore, the inclusion of a charge was by no means meant to be exclusionary, as 
provisions were made to ensure that any individual unable to pay would be covered by 
the state.  Rather, the small fee was to ease the transition into a period in which the state 
would assume an ever-expanding role.   
However, while the cancer initiative provided a service that benefited all patients 
with cancer, regardless of their social standing, it was also advantageous to the 
government.  The reason being, the cancer program was a means through which the state 
could build a provincial identity and serve as a unifying force for the people of 
Saskatchewan. The need for the province to use public policy to mold a provincial image 
for itself was a necessity realized from the outset of Saskatchewan’s entry into 
confederation in 1905.  As the province was comprised of an overwhelmingly rural                                                         88 Legislative Scrapbooks, Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB) S-X3G 28, Seventh 
Legislature, Second Session, March 19, 1930.  89 Bill Waiser, Saskatchewan: A New History (Calgary: Fifth House Ltd, 2005), 283.  90 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population that was void of any singular historic or linguistic continuity due to the large 
number of immigrants from the United Kingdom, continental Europe, Eastern Canada 
and the United States, Saskatchewan, arguably more so than anywhere else in Canada, 
was forced to look elsewhere as a means to establish a provincial identity.92 With 
approximately thirty five percent of its population in 1931 born outside of Canada, it was 
a province that lacked a sense of unified consciousness.93 
One example, in which the developing province attempted to forge a recognizable 
identity for itself, was through the development of an agricultural industry.  This was 
evident as early as 1913 when the Report of the Agricultural Credit Commission 
concluded that, “We [Saskatchewan] must at all hazards beget a provincial 
consciousness.”94 Promoting the cohesiveness of rural life, grain became advertised as 
Saskatchewan’s gold, and was a means through which the government could construct a 
sound social and economic structure.  Furthermore, the state attempted to provide 
security for farmers with the Farm Act passed in 1915 that sought to protect the farmer 
from extreme debt in the purchase of farm machinery.95 Considering that it was the 
opportunity to own and harvest large plots of land that attracted immigrants to the 
prairies, the government’s promotion and support for the embrace of rural life was a 
calculated effort to establish and unify a provincial community.   
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However, with the onset of the great depression, extended droughts, deteriorating 
field conditions and low crop yields called into question the agrarian identity that 
Saskatchewan had constructed for itself.  It is not to say that Saskatchewan abandoned its 
commitment to farming, it is just that the province was primed to renegotiate its 
recognizable identity at the beginning of the 1930s in a manner that was not subject to the 
forces of nature.  In this regard, the transition to a health-focused society was appealing 
because in contrast to the agrarian effort, where nature had overruled the state’s 
objectives, the provision of cancer services that were both scientific and technological 
could overpower the contingencies of social circumstances. With Munroe describing his 
intent to “lead the way in Canada, so far as provincial action is concerned, in dealing with 
the cancer problem on a provincial basis” it suggested that this was a progressive society, 
that paved is own destiny.96  
 One means through which the province sought to establish this position was with 
the construction of an emanation plant at the University of Saskatchewan.  In essence, an 
emanation plant was needed to convert radium into a readily available form for providing 
cancer treatment.  The process involved collecting the gas from a radium salt, “into very 
minute tubes of gold, called seeds.”97 However, the products were not only to benefit 
patients in Saskatchewan, but rather, provided the radium seed requirements for hospitals 
across Western Canada.98 As British Columbia, Alberta and Manitoba all welcomed the 
possibility of utilizing radium seeds produced in Saskatchewan it served as further 
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indication of how the government was acting in a way to solidify Saskatchewan’s 
position as a leader in the race to control cancer.   
The fact that cancer care required such highly specialized equipment is what also 
made the cancer endeavor more ideal for forging an identity as opposed to other previous 
state-sponsored health campaigns.  Joel Howell’s Technology in the Hospital sheds light 
on this assertion, noting that it was the modernization of treatments that transformed the 
hospital into an acceptable middle-class institution.99  As hospitals had previously been 
seen as providing care for only the lower class, the promise of modern scientific care and 
the addition of new technologies changed people’s ideas about the hospital’s function and 
thereby helped to entice a growing number of middle and upper class patients.100  
Subsequently, the cancer initiative in Saskatchewan was very much indicative of the 
reformation of the hospital.  However, the government’s desire to ensure that cost would 
not be a prohibitive factor for individuals to acquire specialized cancer care was also 
indicative of a transition in health care.  As the state embraced a new responsibility to 
make available modern cancer therapies, it presented Saskatchewan with an opportunity 
to brand itself as a province that was very much the purveyor of medical needs and 
served as a sign of developments to come.     
Even before the program was adopted into legislation, Saskatchewan had already 
received a great number of accolades for the proposal of the cancer bill.101 Dr. Shepley 
had discovered these attitudes while he was on a tour of cancer care facilities in eastern 
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Canada in the early months of 1931.102  He later reported to Munroe that the 
“Saskatchewan cancer legislation was already famous as Eastern Canada is looking to  
Saskatchewan for leadership.”103 Munroe shared a similar sentiment with the members of 
legislature in quoting a telegram from the chairman of the British Columbia Cancer 
Committee, Dr. C. W. Prowd, who stated: “Such progressive legislation offers adequate 
solution of the rising and insistent cancer problem. (It) Also maintains Saskatchewan’s 
lead in Public Health Matters.”104 In addition, Munroe quoted an extract from a letter 
written by Dr. G. E. Richards, an authority on radium and radiology at the Toronto 
General Hospital that read:  
I can only say that this meets with my very enthusiastic approval, and I think you 
are to be congratulated in taking these steps which will put this work in 
Saskatchewan far in advance of anything in Canada along these lines.  One envies 
you the opportunity for constructive work which will be made possible by such an 
organization.  I have every confidence that, having undertaken the matter in the 
broad way which is obvious in this legislation, you will have no difficulty in 
working out a scheme which will solve your problem and redound to the credit of 
your province….105  
 
These findings were also echoed in popular culture.  For example, Saturday Night 
magazine commented in its March 27, 1930 edition that the “Canadian prairies were now 
ahead of the federal government and the eastern provinces in regard to cancer.”106 
Although these represent a small sample of the praise directed towards Saskatchewan, 
they serve to show, how even before the first patient received treatment in the Regina 
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Clinic in December of 1931, Saskatchewan had become increasingly recognized for its 
leadership, ingenuity and forward thinking in addressing the cancer problem.107 
 For this reason, it is evident that the state was not only driven by a desire to 
provide for its citizens, but furthermore, by an impetus that extended beyond an  
immediate benefit to the people.  In this regard, this was a society functioning through a 
scheme of cooperation for mutual benefit as the cancer initiative served the dual purpose 
of benefiting both the state and the people.  However, because the cancer program also 
created a benefit to the state it was more than a simplistic or temporary endeavor intended 
to get votes, but rather, a policy that extended beyond partisan politics.  The fact that the 
official opposition lauded the government’s efforts for introducing the cancer program 
hints at this shared devotion.   Apparent in a speech by the former minister of health, Dr. 
J.M. Uhrich, he declared, “any sincere attempt on the part of the government to control or 
reduce the mortality of cancer in Saskatchewan will receive the support of the 
opposition.”108  
Consequently, with a strong non-partisan commitment to cancer it marked a 
period in which subsequent governments remained dedicated to improving and expanding 
upon the provision of cancer services.  The need to re-evaluate the cancer program 
stemmed from Reports of the Department of Vital Health and Vital Statistics, which 
showed that the cancer initiative was not having its desired effect. Rawls’ social contract 
theory again sheds light on this pattern of events as Rawls considers it essential to 
renegotiate the terms of the social contract since the face of society is anything but static 
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and thereby results in failures of the initial contract.109 Therefore, as changing 
governments wanted to sustain the returned benefit of the cancer program, the 
amendments introduced to cancer services throughout the thirties and early forties can 
further be understood as an exercise in state building and is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter Two: The Depression and the War Years: The Expansion of     
 Cancer Services 
 
 The need to revise the provision of cancer services in Saskatchewan emerged 
relatively shortly after the program’s inauguration.  Annual reports from the Department 
of Public Health and Vital Statistics revealed two troubling setbacks.  The first was that 
in 1932 and 1933 a disproportionately small number of cancer patients within the 
province were treated at the clinics.  The limited use of the facilities exposed a second 
problem in that of those patients admitted to the centers, the survival rate of cancer 
patients remained less than fifty percent.  These dismal results revealed inefficiencies in 
the delivery of cancer care in Saskatchewan and consequently, highlighted the need to 
implement further adjustments.  Foreshadowing events to come, the reformation of the 
cancer program became a drawn-out process throughout the 1930s and 1940s, 
culminating in the implementation of the Cancer Control Act in 1944.   
The framework of Rawls’ social contract provides perspective as to why there 
continued to be amendments to the cancer program.  Rawls emphasizes that within all 
societies there are specific economic, social and cultural imperatives that transcend 
political lines, suggesting a great deal of continuity from one administration to the next.  
However, as societies are liable to experience new pressures, such as population growth, 
Rawls acknowledges that the social contract must be re-evaluated in the wake of evolving 
societal conditions.  Building on this element of Rawls’ theory, this chapter argues that 
the continued expansion of the state’s involvement in cancer services stemmed not only 
from a desire to maintain continuity with previous Saskatchewan governments but more 
so to improve on their predecessor’s efforts.   
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Insights into the problems with the program come largely from the Reports of the 
Saskatchewan Cancer Commission (SCC), whose primary purpose was to organize the 
day-to-day administration and organization of the clinics. The most significant reason 
that the Commission believed there were problems stemmed from statistical evidence, 
which was considered an imperative from the program’s outset.  The report offered 
details not only about the number of patients reporting to the clinics but specifics such as 
age, race, gender and occupations of the cancer patients, as well as their medical 
histories, symptoms, previous treatments, results of treatment and prognosis.110 It was a 
result of the strict adherence to data collection that exposed the high percentage of 
patients seeking treatment with advanced stages of the disease that were beyond the reach 
of available therapies.111 Subsequently, the Commission reasoned that if the program was 
going to have its desired effect of curbing the cancer problem then people had to seek 
medical attention earlier.   
To overcome these poor results it became clear to the Commission that a greater 
effort had to be devoted to educating the general public about cancer.  The Commission 
sought guidance in this matter and turned to American cancer activist and educator, Dr. 
Joseph Bloodgood of Baltimore.  Bloodgood was renowned for publishing articles on the 
importance of detecting cancer early and the correlating affect that public education 
played in improving survival rates.  He relayed this belief to the members of the Cancer 
Commission in Saskatchewan, noting that the province should be commended for their 
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efforts directed towards controlling cancer.112 Although, he also added, the greatest 
weapon for combating cancer that still needed to be implemented in Saskatchewan, was 
public education. 113  
The lack of public knowledge about the program was surprising given that at its 
outset Munroe had reasoned that education was absolutely essential for the cancer 
initiative to be effective.114 Beginning in 1929 Munroe made frequent radio addresses 
teaching about the necessity of spotting the warning signs and seeking medical advice 
immediately if at all suspicious about cancer symptoms.115 He reiterated the importance 
of receiving early medical attention when introducing the proposal to launch a 
Saskatchewan cancer program.  Making reference to the fact that Massachusetts was the 
only locale in North America that had developed a cancer program, Munroe credited their 
initial success to a well-organized educational effort that underscored the importance of 
early diagnosis and immediate treatment.116 Consequently, Munroe stressed that the 
government must invest in public education about the disease and its early detection if the 
cancer program was to be successful.  Furthermore, that education required constant and 
persistent attention because if the state neglected to educate the general public, it would 
render the most effective method of treatment null and void.   
Despite advocating this perspective at the program’s inception, the education 
aspect was deliberately neglected by the Commission.  Commissioners reasoned that in 
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promoting this service almost entirely free of charge that the clinics would be inundated 
with patients who did not require care.117 
Munroe’s drastic change in opinion over the importance of education was likely 
influenced by the British Empire Cancer Campaign (BECC), which Saskatchewan 
became a branch of in 1931.118 As the British had launched a public campaign into cancer 
shortly after the turn of the twentieth century, British medical historian Ornella Moscucci 
has shown how the BECC favored a strong anti-educational policy. The reason being, 
medical practitioners felt that an educational effort would only lead to ‘cancerphobia’ 
among the general public. Fearing that doctor’s offices would be overrun by patients 
attempting to take advantage of free health care services, the belief prevailed that lay 
education would only detract from the real focus on controlling the spread of cancer.119  
The minutes of the SCC express a similar concern with members expressing hesitation on 
the issue of publicity, out of fear that it “might seriously crowd the clinics.”120  This 
opinion suggested a tremendous crossover with the BECC in the decision to move away 
from a focus on public educational campaigns.   
By the fall of 1933, however, the SCC had realized that it could no longer neglect 
the education of the laity.  While Bloodgood’s visit ignited a modest education reform it 
was not until the Liberals returned to power in 1934 that a more earnest devotion to 
public education was launched.  The urgency for cancer education was certainly tied to 
the revisions that were made by the Department of Health and Vital Statistics in their                                                         117 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collection of cancer data.  As the previous reports did not take into account the total 
number of cancer cases that existed in the province, the new surveyors felt that these 
summaries were essentially meaningless, as they provided no significant measures for the 
success of the cancer program.121 The first analysis that included a full range of statistical 
data was published in 1934 and provided discouraging results.  They found that of the 
1,081 cases of cancer diagnosed in the province, fewer than half of those patients had 
received treatment in either of the two provincial cancer clinics.122 Data from 1935 
exhibited a similar trend, showing that of the 556 new cases identified that year only 262 
had been referred to the clinics.123 A 1936 report in the Canadian Journal of Public 
Health shed light on the small number of cases reporting for treatments. The most 
intriguing finding revealed that many Saskatchewan residents simply did not believe that 
they could afford the cost of cancer treatment.124 
It is apparent that the intention to provide a cancer service where cost was not a 
prohibitive factor in determining access to care was a message that had not been clearly 
communicated to the general population.  In an attempt to remedy the Conservative 
failure, the new Minister of Health, Dr. J.M. Uhrich, whose elected position warranted 
him membership on the cancer commission board, made public education of the cancer 
problem absolutely paramount.  As Uhrich demonstrated in a 1936 speech to the 
legislature, he stressed than an ill-informed public rendered the most efficient technology                                                         121 Hayter, Element of Hope, 103.  122 Ibid.  123 Public Health Speech Delivered by the Honorable J.M. Uhrich, Minister of Public 
Health and Provincial Secretary in Journals and Speeches – Saskatchewan Legislature – 
Session 1936 volume XXXIV, 19. March 13, 1936.  124 Davison, “Progress in Cancer Control in Saskatchewan,” Canadian Journal of Public 
Health (1936), 498, quoted in Hayter, Element of Hope, 105.  
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useless.125 Therefore, he wanted to emphasize the fear associated with being too late to 
receive effective treatment in the hope that it would drive suspected cancer cases to seek 
consultation early.126 By no means did Uhrich expect this educational task to be an easy 
one that could be accomplished simply through newspaper advertisements.  Rather, 
Uhrich sought a broad range of cooperation that included service clubs, church societies, 
homemakers’ clubs, radio shows and movie presentations in an attempt to reach the 
“consciousness of everyone in the province.”127 
Uhrich was careful to note that education and early diagnosis were not enough to 
defeat the cancer problem.  The Minister stressed that diagnosis must be followed 
immediately by the best available therapies.128 He reinforced that surgery, X-ray and 
radiation therapy were the only recognizable forms of treatment in the province. The need 
to highlight the best available therapies stemmed from the fact that there had been a 
tremendous increase in quackery, with cures being claimed for cancer through non-
traditional methods.129  For example, in 1935, a Kingston, Ontario doctor, named Hendry 
Connell, promoted “Ensol Therapy” as a successful means to combat cancer, which 
resulted in an overwhelming influx of cancer patients from all parts of the continent who 
wanted to take part in the groundbreaking treatment.130 The SCC attempted to verify 
                                                        125 Uhrich, Public Health Speech, 1936, 17.  126 Ibid.  127 Ibid.  
128  Ibid.  129 Ibid.  130 Barbara Clow, 104. Note: Ensol therapy refers to Enzyme (En) Solution (Sol). 
Initially the therapy was designed to treat cataracts.  The premise being that injection of 
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Connell’s results through its own investigation only to find that there was no evidence to 
support the notion that ‘ensol therapy’ actually worked.  Uhrich felt that to avoid the 
referral of patients to doctors like Connell, both the public and physicians needed to be 
educated about the medically-approved treatments, including radiation therapy, that were 
available throughout the province.   
In attempting to improve the effectiveness of the cancer program the Liberals 
acted on the premise that the “government had a responsibility to implement policies that 
would make the path back to prosperity easier.”131 Through the social contract lens, the 
Liberals responded in a way that renegotiated past policies because they were no longer 
satisfactorily creating a benefit for all members of society. Here again, Rawls’ theory 
provides perspective as to why an educational component was so important to the 
programs’ success.  According to Rawls, it is integral for the success of the social 
contract that a condition of publicity be satisfied.  The reason being, that if the social 
contract is to meet the principles of all parties involved then it is only reasonable to 
assume that all parties have knowledge of the principles they are entitled to.132 Therefore, 
the failure to educate the general public creates cracks in the foundation of the social 
contract and signals places where the terms of the agreement must be re-evaluated.   
It is the contention of this thesis that governments rarely, if ever, pursue these 
endeavors to provide the best society for its citizens with altruistic intentions.  Rather, as 
has already been discussed in the first chapter, there must be a benefit in return to the 
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state.  In this respect, the Liberal devotion to the cancer program was very much a 
continuation of cementing a provincial identity that began with the Conservatives.  As the 
province had received such high esteem at the program’s outset it was a means of 
establishing a positive recognizable identity for the province that the Liberals did not 
want to lose.  Furthermore, it was all the more imperative to solidify Saskatchewan’s 
leadership in cancer care given the growing national attention that was being directed 
towards the disease.   
In 1935 for example, to celebrate the Silver Jubilee of King George V, the 
Governor General, the Earl of Bessborough, decreed that monies be raised in support of 
the cancer cause.133  According to historian Robert A. Macbeth, it was common practice 
for countries of the British Commonwealth to present the King with gifts on occasions 
such as the Silver Jubilee of a Monarch’s coronation.134 However, King George V asked 
that on account of the difficult times that were crippling countries around the world that 
monies be directed in support of some worthy national project. Asking each nation in the 
commonwealth to select a specific cause that merited assistance, the Governor General 
chose cancer control as Canada’s project.  Although the exact reasons for the Earl of 
Bessborough choosing cancer are not clear, it reinforces that by the mid-1930s a culture 
of cancer existed in Canada. The growing attention directed towards cancer made 
Saskatchewan, as a province, determined to improve the efficacy of its cancer clinics, 
which by all accounts were severely underperforming, in an attempt to reaffirm its 
position as the Canadian leader against cancer.                                                           133 Robert A. Macbeth, “The Origin of the Canadian Cancer Society,” Canadian Bulletin 
of Medical History 22, no. 1 (2005): 163.  134 Ibid., 164. 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The result was that in subsequent years the Minister of Health remained dedicated 
to widespread education as an essential need in the fight against cancer.135  The 
production of a short documentary film in 1937 entitled, “Rays of Hope” was another 
means through which educational efforts attempted to attract a broader audience.  Yet, in 
spite of these efforts “the mortality from cancer continued to climb.”136 Uhrich 
nonetheless reasoned, “that many of these deaths need not have occurred” as it was “the 
failure of the patient to seek early treatment, not the provision of imperfect remedies for 
the disease” that was the major reason for the climbing death rate. Uhrich implied, that in 
order for the cancer campaign to be successful the final responsibility rested with 
individuals who needed to seek medical attention in a timely manner.   
The argument that fault lay with the citizens and not with the accessibility or 
quality of the therapies being provided was likely influenced by the high number of 
accolades that continued to praise Saskatchewan for its leadership in cancer control.  This 
point was made evident in a 1938 address by a Professor of Pathology at the University 
of Alberta, Dr. J.J. Ower, to delegates at the annual convention of the United Farmers of 
Alberta (UFA).  Ower claimed that, “Saskatchewan is far in the lead in Canada in the 
treatment of cancer.”137 That general public interest in the subject must be aroused and 
that “it is only through the influence of bodies such as yours [UFA] that a campaign, such 
as the one Saskatchewan is conducting, can be instituted.”138 Praise expressing the desire 
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to emulate Saskatchewan’s endeavors explains the heightened confidence that Uhrich had 
in the program they had spearheaded and why he identified the citizen as the ideal 
scapegoat in attempting to understand the failure to achieve better results.   
Rawls’ social contract helps to explain why the decision to blame the public for 
the failure of the cancer program was ultimately problematic. The reason being, the social 
contract requires re-evaluation over time, as the changing nature of society leads to 
inefficiencies in the original agreement.  However, since Uhrich inferred that the problem 
lay with the users and not the establishment itself, there was no impetus to renegotiate, let 
alone consider, what improvements could be made to cancer care. Even though there may 
have been a great deal of truth that the population was at fault, by no means is it right to 
think that these problems were completely one-sided, that there was nothing the state 
could do to improve cancer services.  In thinking so, it resulted in a static period of 
neglect.    
This is not to say that there were no amendments whatsoever to the Saskatchewan 
cancer initiative; however, the scale on which changes were made was limited to an 
administrative and organizational level. For instance, in 1939 efforts focused on 
increasing the number of physicians and nursing staff employed in the clinics.139  Dr. 
Allan Blair, an associate in Radiology at the Toronto General Hospital and a highly 
respected expert in cancer services, believed that in order for the program to be a success 
it needed to be further centralized.   Expanding the radiotherapist positions from part-time 
to full-time with the clinics operating five days a week, as opposed to the initial three, 
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Allan Blair, “Memorandum on Management of Cancer In Saskatchewan,” 
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was one means through which amendments were made to make the clinics more readily 
available to patients and thereby improve the efficacy of cancer care.140 While Blair’s 
recommendations were implemented in 1939, it marked the end of the Liberal venture in 
reforming Saskatchewan’s cancer program, as Uhrich believed that the province had done 
all that was required of them to overcome the cancer problem. 
Upholding the status quo was a common practice by the provincial Liberals, who 
were resistant to implementing reforms in health, education or welfare.141 It was only 
with the rise of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) to the status of the 
official opposition that the Liberals came under pressure to readdress cancer services.  
Under the leadership of George Hara Williams, the CCF advocated for a greater 
expansion of the welfare state as a means of providing prosperity for its citizens.  One 
example in which the CCF pressed the Liberals was in regard to a bill that “favoured a 
further expansion of state-aided hospitalization and medical services in the province, 
especially to those living in rural areas.” 142 Although the Liberals passed the bill, adding 
the stipulation that it would only be implemented when the finances of the province were 
stable enough to permit such an endeavor, it nonetheless demonstrated the pressure the 
CCF exerted on the Patterson government to expand the provision of health care 
services.143 
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The desire to expand the welfare state continued in 1943 as a Special Committee 
was struck to consider issues such as social welfare legislation, social security and the 
provision of health services.144 With respect to health care specifically, a consensus of the 
assembly supported the province cooperating “with the Government of Canada in 
developing and putting into operation a National plan of Health Insurance.”145 This 
changing culture of the expanding welfare state finally exposed the antiquated policy of 
the Saskatchewan cancer program. Overturning their previous position from five years 
earlier, which refused to amend cancer care because the failure of the service was 
perceived to be that of the patient, the Liberals under this renewed mandate introduced 
the most far-reaching reforms for cancer care, calling for the provision of “treatment and 
hospitalization to persons suffering from Cancer [sic] without cost to the patient.”146   
Considering that prior to this proposal the Liberal’s public policy was stagnant 
and in a period of paralysis, something had definitely ignited their desire to renegotiate 
the provision of cancer services.  In this regard, the Liberal objective to expand cancer 
services was very much driven by politics and was done in an attempt to provide 
campaign fodder for re-election.   The Liberals had fallen out of favor with the electorate 
after they had remained in power beyond their five-year mandate, using the war as 
justification of an extraneous circumstance to expand the life of government for one 
additional year.147 In an effort to re-align themselves with the popularity of the social 
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assistance policies promoted by the CCF, the Cancer Act can thus be thought of as an 
attempt to win favor with a disgruntled electorate.  This last ditch attempt did little to 
persuade Saskatchewan voters to support the Liberals, who ultimately lost to a large CCF 
majority in the 1944 election.  
The timing and circumstances surrounding the Liberal’s renewed interest in 
cancer is in keeping with the argument that there is very much a selfish interest guiding a 
government’s modus operandi.  That it is idealistic to think that governments act to 
establish a society that imposes benefits for all citizens, regardless of societal 
circumstance, without wanting something in return.  Subsequently, the Liberal approach 
revealed that when the returned benefit to the state was lost it in turn had the effect on 
detracting from the benefit to the population as well. As this situation no longer fits 
Rawls’ description of society being a scheme of cooperation for mutual benefit, it is 
appropriate that the population looked to a new power to restore this relationship.  
In this regard, it is fitting that it was the CCF under the leadership of Tommy 
Douglas, who was also simultaneously the Minister of Public Health, that passed into 
legislation the Cancer Control Act in October 1944.  The Act ensured that any individual 
who had resided in Saskatchewan for at least six months “was eligible for all services 
necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer, without charge, including all 
specialized diagnostic and radio therapeutic services and all surgical operations for the 
treatment of cancer.”148  The expansion of the cancer services provided by the state thus 
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served as evidential proof of the continued devotion that Saskatchewan governments had 
to providing cancer care, as well as the efforts that were made to expand and improve on 
their predecessors policies.   
The benefit to the CCF for expanding the cancer program came in the form of 
restored efforts to establish Saskatchewan as a leader in cancer care, and to forge a strong 
provincial identity as a progressive region. Douglas had acknowledged in a campaign 
speech that, “We (the CCF) are desirous of building a more just and secure economy; but 
we are conscious of the fact that when we have improved the economic lot of mankind, 
we have only begun the much greater task of building a new society…”149 As the Cancer 
Act was to ensure that the cost of receiving treatment from increasingly specialized and 
modern equipment would not prevent an individual from obtaining all the care that he/she 
required, it epitomized the CCF’s objective of constructing a provincial identity.   
The expansion of services provided by the state and the complete removal of costs 
proved to be a tipping point for encouraging patients to seek care early. As the number of 
individuals receiving treatment in the clinics jumped twofold between 1944 and 1946 to 
reach 2,626 patients per annum Saskatchewan had developed “a more comprehensive 
cancer program than any other province or state on the North American Continent.”150 
These findings suggest that even though the inclusion of a charge in the original act was 
never meant to be exclusionary, the sudden climb in patients requiring services following 
the implementation of the Cancer Act in 1944 suggests that to some degree cost, in 
addition to inadequate education, had been a prohibitive factor.   
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Of course, it could also be thought that the Cancer Control Act marked a 
recognizable and accepted transformation of the hospital from an institution associated 
with charity to a facility offering specialized care for all people regardless of societal 
position. It has already been discussed in a previous chapter how at the beginning of the 
twentieth century public perception viewed hospitals as primarily for the poor.  However, 
with the passing of the Cancer Control Act it is evident that these affiliations no longer 
held true. Hospitals had become accepted as modern facilities providing industrial and 
scientific health care, and as such needed to be available to the whole population.151 
The Saskatchewan government wanted to support this redefinition of the hospital 
by ensuring that the cancer services being delivered in their clinics was the most 
scientifically and technologically advanced. The need to keep pace with advancing 
technologies was exposed by some new scientific breakthroughs that emerged during the 
Second World War.  The betatron, for example, developed in 1940 by Donald Kerst of 
the University of Illinois, offered a far more efficient and cost effective means of 
delivering radiotherapy than radium.152 Although there were some doubts expressed by 
the National Research Council President, Dr C.J. Mackenzie, as to whether research of 
the betatron was advanced enough to properly benefit cancer care, the newly appointed 
full- time physicist for the Saskatchewan Cancer Commission, Dr. Harold E. Johns, 
thought otherwise.   
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Johns argued that the betatron offered “a method of delivering easily a high dose 
to tumors at a depth, without appreciably affecting the overlying skin.”153 As this 
technology would reduce the risk of radiation sickness he requested approval from the 
University of Saskatchewan and the Premier/Health Minister, Tommy Douglas, to 
purchase a betatron.154 Receiving approval in 1946, it was another two years before the 
unit was manufactured by the Allis-Chalmers Plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.155 
Following the installation of the unit in the summer of 1948, it took another year of tests 
and calibrations before the first cancer patient received treatment on March 29, 1949.156  
In doing so, Saskatchewan became the first province to use betatron treatment on a 
routine basis in Canada and demonstrated once again that the province was at the 
forefront in providing inclusive, specialized treatments for cancer patients.157  
 The cost of operating the betatron, however, proved to be rather expensive and 
although it was cheaper than acquiring natural sources of radium, Johns and his 
colleagues began considering alternative sources to provide high-energy radiation 
therapy. One option that Johns believed could replace the betatron was the application of 
cobalt-60.  As a natural by-product of atomic reactors, cobalt-60 could be produced in 
vast quantities at a fraction of the cost of providing radium and/or betatron therapy. Johns 
first became exposed to the possibility of cobalt-60, as a radiation source, while attending 
a series of lectures in Toronto by a British medical physicist named M.V. Mayneord.158 
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He predicted that cobalt-60 was a more suitable source than radium in the treatment of 
cancer.  This prediction ignited Johns’ belief that this technology held tremendous 
potential for the future of cancer care.   
The construction of a nuclear reactor in Chalk River, Ontario during the War 
spurred Johns’ hope that cobalt-60 therapy could be provided in Saskatchewan. Canada 
became the benefactor of a nuclear reactor as a result of a British desire to avoid an 
American monopoly on nuclear power.159 Consequently, Chalk River became the site of 
the first self-sustained nuclear reaction to occur outside of the United States in September 
of 1945.160 However, with Chalk River’s inauguration coinciding with the end of the 
Second World War, the objectives of the plant were shifted to entirely peaceful purposes.   
One area of nuclear power that research and development pursued in the post-war 
era was the production of cobalt-60. Researchers discovered that when cobalt was placed 
in the reactor it quickly adopted another neutron. The resulting product, termed an 
isotope, was considered ideal for cancer therapy since it emitted far more radiation than 
naturally occurring radium.  Furthermore, considering the unique specifications of Chalk 
River’s design, the Canadian reactor was able to produce cobalt-60 at a rate that was 
unmatched by any other reactor in the world. Given these conditions, Johns recognized in 
a visit to the facility in June of 1949 that “cobalt would offer even better and more 
economical opportunities for cancer therapy.161 
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In spite of the tremendous faith in the potential of cobalt-60, a mechanism to 
deliver this therapy was still required. Believing that he could accomplish this task, Johns 
wrote to the President of the University of Saskatchewan, Walter P. Thompson on July 
15, 1949, asking for between $2500 and $7000 to develop an effective source of 1000 
curies of cobalt-60.162  However, Johns and his colleagues quickly realized that this 
project would likely receive greater priority if it were considered as a research project, 
which fell under the mandate of the province.163 With this in mind, Johns, accompanied 
by Dr. Allan Blair, visited Premier Douglas in Regina in an attempt to expedite an 
approval.164 
While it is known that Douglas had an open door policy with no need for 
appointments, Johns was especially comfortable in making an unannounced visit, as he 
had known the Premier since he was a young boy.  This relationship stemmed from the 
fact that when Douglas was a student at Brandon College, his favorite math teacher, Dr. 
Alfred Edward Johns, the father of Harold Johns, would on occasion invite Douglas over 
for Sunday dinner.  As a result of this relationship, Douglas observed that even at an early 
age, the young Johns showed great promise as a scholar.  Therefore, when Johns and 
Blair made their pitch to develop a high voltage radiotherapy program without any 
documented evidence or reports, it was on account of the integrity of the people making 
the proposal that Douglas gave his consent.  Bypassing “the cabinet, the treasury and the 
University Board of Governors,” Douglas acted alone to give the government’s approval                                                         162 Ibid. Note: a Curie is the unit of radioactivity.  Named after Marie and Pierre Curie.  
The 1000 curies requested was equivalent to about 100 times the activity of any radium 
unit.   163 Ibid., 149.   164 Ibid. 
  
56 
to pursue cobalt-60 for cancer therapy in Saskatchewan.165 In doing so, it affirmed 
Douglas’ pre-election commitment to using local resources and industries to shape a 
society.  Furthermore, it is another testament to how the desire to lead the way in cancer 
care became tied to the formation of a positive provincial identity.   
Subsequently, upon receiving Douglas’ support, Johns along with a graduate 
student named Lloyd Bates, set out to determine an effective means for providing cobalt-
60 therapy. Arriving at a design, the construction of the machine was left in the hands of 
the proprietor of Acme Machine and Electric, located in Saskatoon. Co-named after Mr. 
J. A. Mackay of the machine shop, and Harold Johns, the Mackay-Johns collimator was 
installed in the newly constructed cancer wing at the University of Saskatchewan on 
August 17, 1951.166  The first cancer patient received cobalt-60 therapy on November 8, 
1951.167 The three-month delay between installation and treatment stemmed from the fact 
that Johns insisted upon rigorous measurements for determining exact dosages to ensure 
that the patient would not be in any danger.168 The delay resulted in a cobalt unit in 
London, Ontario, of a different design, claiming the title of being the first to treat a 
patient in Canada.169 Although the London unit was not put through the same rigorous 
tests employed in Saskatchewan, the Canadian press widely publicized the London 
achievement as being the first in the world.  However, not to be outdone, an editorial in 
the November 7, 1951 edition of the Saskatoon Star Phoenix challenged the medias 
assertion.  Asserting that, in respect to a cobalt unit “one is indeed, or to be more                                                         165 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166 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accurate, one has been installed” in Saskatoon.170 The desire to affirm Saskatchewan’s 
place in the cancer effort is further indicative of the image they were attempting to 
present, as a province dedicated to providing ever more efficient and economical cancer 
treatments for its citizens. Moreover, the fact that the first woman to receive treatment on 
the London unit died shortly after receiving therapy, while the Saskatoon patient lived 
another fifty-two years suggested a devotion to quality that was unmatched in the nation.  
The dedication by the CCF to ensure the provision of cancer therapies that were 
both highly specialized and technologically sophisticated was very much a commitment 
to the same imperatives outlined by Munroe at the initial outset of the cancer 
commission. In this regard, the CCF not only continued, but also, improved and 
expanded on the legacy of cancer care that the province had already developed for itself. 
The outcome of the cancer initiatives implemented under the Douglas government 
appeared just as significant in solidifying Saskatchewan’s reputation as a progressive 
society dedicated to the health of its citizens.  The development of the Mackay-Johns 
collimator proved to be not only effective, but also economical to purchase and maintain.  
It drew immediate international demands.  Mackay’s small engineering firm in Saskatoon 
produced one hundred collimators for nations around the world for more than thirty-
years, with Saskatchewan’s model serving as the staple for administering cobalt 
therapy.171 As more than 2500 units remained in use around the world in 1984, 
Saskatchewan remained a recognizable leader in the fight against cancer.172 Meaning, that 
Douglas’ gamble in Johns had an enormous pay off for both the patient, who benefited                                                         170 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from having cutting edge care provided at the state’s expense, and the province, who 
continued to solidify its reputation as a leader in the fight against cancer.   
In tracing how the Saskatchewan cancer commission developed over a twenty-
year period it is clear that the province employed a scheme of cooperation that was 
mutually beneficial to the parties involved.  Rawls’ social contract provided perspective 
for understanding the development of cancer care in Saskatchewan amidst the turbulent 
period of economic instability and political turnover.  However, while this chapter has 
focused on the contribution the province had in shaping cancer care it is also important to 
realize that in the aftermath of the Second World War the federal government took on a 
growing involvement in supporting the cancer care effort. With the Dominion expanding 
its role in cancer services in the post-war period, the next chapter will show that many of 
the same elements used for understanding the program at the provincial level were also 
applicable to the dominion’s increasing involvement in cancer services.   
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Chapter Three:  From Province to Dominion: The Federal Involvement 
          In Cancer Care 
 
 By 1946 Saskatchewan had established a cancer program whereby all citizens, 
regardless of their ability to pay, could receive treatments at the expense of the state. 
Saskatchewan had created an optimal set of cancer services by incorporating pioneering 
innovative methods for delivering ever-advanced therapies.  However, in addition to the 
role of the provincial government in creating this model, it would be an error to neglect 
the contribution of the dominion.  As the dominion began to expand its involvement in 
provincial affairs after the Second World War, the provision of both funds and 
radioisotopes to Saskatchewan at the end of the 1940s became integral to the success of 
the cancer endeavor.   
 While it is understandable how this arrangement would be of benefit to the 
patient, adhering to the argument established in the first two chapters, there must also be 
some benefit to the state.  In this regard, the development of a radioisotope industry had 
been motivated by economic incentives. As Prime Minister Mackenzie King believed that 
the federal government had a responsibility to procure a strong and stable nation, 
stimulation of the economy through exports was one way in which this could be 
achieved.  Subsequently, with a growing international demand for radioisotopes in the 
post-war period, this industry served as a market for the government to secure economic 
stability.  Consequently, with this imperative to meet, it not only provided a driving force 
for the federal government to produce this technology, but furthermore, served the dual 
purpose of aiding in the provision of cancer care in Saskatchewan and thereby enabling 
the province to retain its position as a leader and pioneer in cancer care.   
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 Before considering the motivation and impact of the dominion’s involvement in 
the Saskatchewan cancer program, it is first important, if not necessary, to understand the 
background and context of the federal government’s growing desire to expand its role in 
provincial affairs.  The impetus for the dominion to take on a greater responsibility 
stemmed largely from issues exposed during the Great Depression. Canada was 
particularly hard hit by the Depression due to the disappearance of markets for export 
staples.173 In the prairies (Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba), for example, the decline in 
agricultural exports resulted in the net income from farm operations dropping from $363 
million in 1928 to a negative $10, 728, 000 in 1932.174 The result was an increasing 
number of people who did not have a sufficient income to survive on.175 This dire 
situation was further compounded given that the relief for destitute families and 
individuals was a municipal responsibility, which was modeled after the nineteenth-
century English Poor Law.176 The problem with this arrangement was that municipalities 
and provinces were limited in their capacity to generate revenues since the ability to tax 
their citizens lay with the federal government.177 As a result, with the provinces unable to 
procure funds, the severity of the Depression’s conditions exposed the difficulties with 
the financial arrangements of the British North America Act and served as a catalyst for 
Canadians to look to the federal government for some sort of relief.     
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 A creative strategy employed by some people who urgently needed relief was to 
write directly to their millionaire Prime Minister R.B. Bennett.  Receiving letters from 
hard-up cases all across Canada, the independently wealthy PM often went above and 
beyond to personally aid people in their plight.178  The content of letters ranged from 
children seeking money for sporting goods and Christmas presents to more basic requests 
for the simple necessities of everyday life.  For instance, in September 1933 Mrs. Thomas 
Perkins of Kingdom, Saskatchewan wrote Bennett asking for money to buy her husband 
underwear.179  Describing the complete failure of their crops and the corresponding lack 
of funds to live Perkins’ letter highlights the extent of the suffering encountered by 
people on the prairies during the depression.   
 Other letters speak of the tremendous hardships that parents felt in providing for 
their family.  John Eldon of Banner, Saskatchewan wrote to the Prime Minister following 
the birth of their triplets.  Adding to the four small children they already had, he was 
extremely concerned given the conditions in 1932 about his ability to provide for his 
seven children. 180 A 1935 letter from Mrs J.W. Gruzlewski expressed a similar sentiment 
explaining how her nine children had no shoes or clothes of any kind to go to school in.181 
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These pleas to the Prime Minister establish how amid the continued deteriorating 
conditions of the depression an increased desperation led many citizens to embrace the 
possibility of receiving assistance.  Yet, as discussed in chapter one, the transition to 
accepting handouts was by no means a rapid process as many people still found it 
extremely difficult to even contemplate handouts in the 1930s.  Mrs. P. E. Bottle of 
Craven, Saskatchewan illustrates the internal conflicts people had in asking for help.  
Writing to Prime Minister R.B. Bennett in February of 1935 Bottle said:  
 Please don't think I'm crazy for writing you, but I've got three little children, and 
they are all in need of shoes as well as underwear... I don't know what to do. I hate 
to ask for help... but if you don't want to do this please don't mention it over radios 
as everyone knows me around here and I'm well liked, so I beg of you not to 
mention my name. I've never asked anyone around here for help or clothes, as I 
know them to well.182 
 
Bottle’s letter not only highlights the frustration felt by citizens in the thirties, but 
furthermore demonstrates how federal leaders had first-hand knowledge of the struggles 
its citizens were encountering. As Bennett replied to her plea by sending her five dollars 
of his own money, he acknowledged the urgent need for the federal government to re-
evaluate its responsibility to the people.183  
 Although Bennett was defeated before his government could implement major 
reforms, his successor, Mackenzie King, also embraced the need to renegotiate the terms 
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of the constitution. To achieve this, the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial 
relations was launched in 1937 with the objective to determine how:  
the distribution of legislative powers essential to a proper carrying out of the 
federal system in harmony with national needs and the promotion of national 
unity, will best effect a balanced relationship between the financial powers and 
the obligations and functions of each governing body, and conduce to a more 
efficient, independent and economical discharge of governmental responsibilities 
in Canada.184 
 
 
Taking three years to assemble all the evidence, the Commission suggested that the 
provinces transfer their main fiscal powers to the federal government.  However, as the 
arrangement would make the provinces financially dependent on the federal government, 
the provinces were split on the Commission’s recommendations. The discord likely 
stemmed from the varying conditions experienced by the provinces during the 
Depression. As some provinces, like Saskatchewan, were hit much harder by the 
depression, they appreciated the benefit of assistance much more than Ontario or Quebec, 
who were not nearly as devastated by the economic downturn.  Consequently, in being 
unable to reach an agreement the Commission’s report was officially shelved.   
It was not until 1945 that another effort to establish a new partnership was struck 
between the federal government and the provinces. The focus of the conference aimed at 
creating the conditions that would ensure high employment and income throughout the 
nation.185 This belief was tied to the hope of sustaining the prosperity that had returned to 
Canada with the outbreak of the Second World War in the post-war period.186 The 
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American detonation of the atomic bomb over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 signaled a 
rapidly approaching finality to the war and coincided with the date set for the first post-
war planning meeting in Canada. The delegates focused on fields such as social security, 
health insurance and transportation as areas that would contribute to creating the ideal 
conditions necessary for stimulating wealth and the economy.  However, in spite of the 
realization to speed along post-war planning, there was still much debate in regards to 
how the provincial-dominion arrangement should take shape.  Opposition was 
particularly strong from Quebec and Ontario, which deemed that such a partnership 
would result in a net transfer of income that would ultimately hinder financial growth.187 
Consequently, since such issues were too large to overcome the conference foundered on 
May 3, 1946.188  
Despite the failure to reach an official agreement between the federal and 
provincial governments, King’s Liberals slowly began to expand the dominion’s 
involvement in provincial matters.  One of the most significant areas that the dominion 
ventured into was the health care domain. Evidence of this commitment is apparent from 
an address by the Prime Minister on May 14, 1948 where he announced “that thirty 
million dollars would be made available to the provinces for health care through ten 
separate grants.189 The grants targeted a variety of areas providing funds for services such 
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as the treatment and cure for TB, mental diseases and the construction of hospitals.190 
Unfortunately, this money turned out to be of little benefit to Saskatchewan since it had 
already invested capital in the construction of hospitals as part of its Hospital Services 
Plan, which was launched in 1946 and therefore, did not qualify for reimbursement.191  
However, another area of the grant that did benefit Saskatchewan was the money 
allocated to funding cancer services.  Beginning in 1949, the federal government 
specified that three and a half million dollars (from the thirty million total) would be 
available for cancer control across the dominion.192 These monies would reimburse the 
provinces fifty cents for every dollar they spent on cancer control, up to a maximum 
figure that was set annually by the federal government.  In the first year of funding 
Saskatchewan maxed out its allowable contribution at $234, 671.193 This situation 
suggests that the province was wiling to utilize all the tools at its disposal to further 
advance its effort to provide cancer services.   
The dominion’s decision to provide these funds was very much tied to a desire to 
bring the benefits of modern medicine to more of its citizens.  The Minister of National 
Health and Welfare, Paul Martin, expressed this sentiment in 1948 claiming that financial 
support to the provinces was a means through which the highest standards of service 
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could be provided to the people.194 As the increasing sophistication and modernization of 
treatment was invariably raising the cost of medicine, Martin wanted to ensure that the 
“adequate facilities were available to the doctor to provide the care that he is trained to 
give.”195 Martin also wanted to ensure that no barriers existed between the doctor and the 
patient that would ultimately weaken the doctor’s effectiveness because it would only 
enhance the suffering of the patient and allow diseases to advance beyond the reach of 
medicine.196 
In this respect, there is a strong corollary between the factors that motivated 
Martin and those that spurred Munroe to first support Saskatchewan’s cancer initiative.  
With the mandate of the federal health grants holding that monies needed to be provided 
to overcome social and economic inequalities so that everyone could benefit from 
medical technologies, the state was providing the conditions that enabled all citizens the 
opportunity to further their own ends. From a Rawlsian perspective, the dominion was 
acting, just as the province had done, to ensure that the advantages of social cooperation 
were advantageous to all members of society. 
However, in addition to providing financial assistance the federal government 
also took on the role of sourcing pivotal medical tools that were of increasing importance 
to administering cancer care.  One tool that was considered by the dominion as a 
necessity for improving the quality of cancer care was the production of radioisotopes in 
Chalk River for delivering radiotherapy.  With the government’s purchase of the                                                         194 F.W. Jackson, “Organized Medicine in a National Health Program,” Canadian 
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Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited Company in 1943, which oversaw the 
management of Chalk River, the industry came under government control. Initially, 
radioisotopes were considered such an important discovery for medical science that 
Chalk River produced and distributed isotopes freely in pursuit of research goals and in 
the hope of sharing information to aid in the development of an exciting new field.197  
Subsequently, the first institution to receive a shipment from Chalk River was the 
University of Saskatchewan on October 31, 1947.198 
Amid this initial policy to provide radioisotopes freely to research institutions 
discussions were already underway about the tremendous potential of selling its products 
in the global market. 199 The reason for this opportunity is apparent from a May 3, 1947 
Collier’s magazine article by science journalist Alfred Q. Maisel entitled “Medical 
Dividends.”  As Maisel explained, “to scientists, radioactive isotopes are tools of power 
in the eternal fight against pain and death; they may be even means of prying open the 
once tightly shut door to an understanding of the inner processes of life.”200 An article in 
Maclean’s magazine echoed a similar forecast claiming that, “(nuclear) reactors will soon 
be stationed at strategic points across the continent, ready to supply any amount of 
powerful ray-emitting atoms.”201 Bill Bennett, the man responsible for the day-to-day 
affairs of Eldorado was familiar with the “great expectations from the scientific world” in 
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regards to radioisotopes.202  As a result of this realization, Bennett insisted by 1947 that 
the isotope branch at Chalk River not only develop methods to make and purify those 
radioisotopes that were expected to come into demand, but furthermore, to include a 
provision in the budget for the marketing of isotopes.203   
These sentiments highlight an important means through which the state could 
benefit by providing this service.  That is, the exporting of radioisotopes could help to 
ensure a strong and stable economy.  The fact that the development of the radioisotope 
industry was driven by market incentives is very much indicative of the growing 
influence that economist John Maynard Keynes was having on Canadian economic 
policy makers.  The influence of Keynesian economics on the Canadian government 
emerged in the aftermath of the Great Depression as he argued that it was the relative 
inaction of depression era governments that contributed to the problems prevalent 
throughout the decade.204 Keynes surmised that the government had a responsibility to 
provide the conditions for prosperity through stimulation of the economy.205  
Subsequently, with economists in Canada setting out to apply Keynes’ theory to 
Canadian circumstances, his theories became highly influential in shaping government 
practices, as a policy of high and stable government spending on exports was promoted 
as a means of increasing employment and income.206   
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Consequently, it was with the realization that the production of radioisotopes 
could serve as a stabilizing force for the economy that efforts were directed at 
establishing a global presence.  Streamlining the market division of radioisotopes in 1947 
actually encouraged the Americans to further their own development and distribution of 
radioisotopes. As historian Angela Creager explained, the Americans felt that “they 
needed to begin distributing radioisotopes to foreign nations so that they could stake their 
claim on the market before the Canadian reactor was up and running.”207 The fact that 
there was such stark competition for a market that did not yet exist in 1947 suggests how 
quickly the market was expected to develop and therefore the need to be ready. 
To capitalize on the growing market potential of radioisotopes the Eldorado 
Mining and Refining Limited Company received exclusive rights to distribute cobalt-60 
to commercial and industrial users in September 1949.208 By March, 1951 Eldorado took 
control of all isotopes destined for commercial or industrial markets and changed its 
name to Eldorado’s Commercial Products Division (CPD) with efforts directed at 
establishing a marketing campaign to distribute isotopes abroad.209  The organization 
underwent further changes in the following year when the Atomic Energy of Canada 
Limited (AECL) took over control of Chalk River.  It was not long before suggestions 
were made that CPD should fall under this umbrella as well.  As CPD’s products no 
longer came from Eldorado’s mining operations it only made sense that it should join 
AECL.210 Following minor negotiations AECL took over CPD on August 1, 1952 and 
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while transitioning CPD to a crown corporation, the sales organization established under 
Eldorado remained intact as CPD was to remain profit-oriented and focused on 
establishing a global presence.211   
The desire to expand the products’ share of the marketplace resulted in cobalt-60 
being produced for both medical and non-medical applications.  For instance, in addition 
to its use against deep-seated tumors, cobalt-60 was also utilized as a tool to sterilize 
medical supplies, to assist the study of gamma-radiation effects on materials through 
laboratory experiments, and finally to extend the shelf life and storage time of food.212 
Creating so many avenues for the distribution of isotopes, CPDs products came into high 
demand in the 1950s as market competition between nations started to open up.  
Exporting its products to the U.S., Europe and Asia, CPD established itself as a major 
supplier of bulk radioisotope products to much of the world, as global demand for 
isotopes rose 1500 percent between 1955 and 1960.213 CPD even sold its products in 
China and the Soviet Union at a time when it was unheard of for a western enterprise to 
make sales forays into the communist world.  It was undeniable that Canada had 
established a global presence in the radioisotope market.   
In this regard, the devotion to providing this service abroad can also be thought 
of, in addition to procuring a stable economic climate, as a further endeavor into forming 
a national identity. The need to establish an international identity, as an advanced and 
technological nation in the early sixties was all the more significant given the damage 
that was done to Canada’s image at the end of the 50s with the Avro Arrow debacle.  As                                                         211 Hurst, 100.  212 Ibid., 105.  213 Ibid., 107.  
  
71 
Canada had developed a supersonic jet in the post-war period it very much served as a 
symbol of the country’s technological prowess.   However, with the support for the 
project being pulled by Diefenbaker’s government in February 1959, the cancellation of 
the jet was perceived as a “betrayal of Canada’s potential to take its rightful place in the 
world’s modern high-tech economy.”214 Furthermore, an additional unfortunate outcome 
from its cancellation was that it resulted in a brain drain of scientists and engineers to 
NASA’s Space task group.215   However, according to historian Robert Bothwell the end 
of the Arrow was an important lesson for Diefenbaker’s government and was a 
significant factor with the Conservative’s favoring plans “to improve its shaky standing 
in the realm of high technology.”216 
Subsequently, with perceptions of Canada’s devotion to innovation and ingenuity 
being tarnished, this turn around helps explain why it was so important for the federal 
government to establish a global identity in the distribution of radioisotopes, as it was a 
means through which the Canadian commitment to high technology could be restored. 
The desire to establish a global presence in the radioisotope industry was further 
solidified in 1961 when the Americans withdrew from the isotope business altogether.217 
The decision to do so was likely influenced by the fact that in 1959-1960 CPD had been 
outselling its American counterpart in Oakridge by more than eighty percent.  As a result, 
these conditions led to even greater research and development by CPD to expand the 
potential markets.  One area that research and development focused on using                                                         214 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radioisotopes was for improving crop yields through food irradiation.  Treating food with 
irradiation eliminated insects, reduced bacteria and stopped sprouting.218 The benefit of 
this course of action was that it had tremendous potential for “reducing losses, improving 
quality, extending shelf-life enlarging markets and tracking health problems.”219 
Consequently, this relatively untapped market led R.F. Frington, vice-president of the 
CPD to conclude that, “this was but another area of radioisotope development that held 
tremendous economic potential for the Canadian economy.”220 
However, while the government remained dedicated to exporting its radioisotopes 
as a stimulus for the economy, this commitment also proved advantageous to 
Saskatchewan’s continuing desire to lead the nation in cancer care and maintain its 
reputation as a leader in cancer care. As the province was primed through the 
development of the Mackay-Johns Collimator to administer cobalt-60 it continued to 
propel Saskatchewan to the forefront in treating cancer. A 1953 article in the Saskatoon 
Leader Post entitled “Cancer Research Program in Saskatchewan Receives Praise,” by 
Dr. O. H. Warwick, the executive director of the National Cancer Institute in Toronto, 
acknowledged the tremendous contributions and leadership that had been made in 
Saskatchewan, particularly in respect to the field of radiation therapy.221 Another article 
on March 14, 1955 entitled “Saskatchewan Leads in Cancer Research” contained a 
similar sentiment.  Reporting on a speech by the president of the Canadian Cancer 
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Society, Dr. F. R. Butterfield, to a congregation of the unit in Swift Current he 
proclaimed that, “as the result of education and treatment the program in Saskatchewan is 
being jealously examined by all other provinces.”222  
Although the failure to adequately educate the public was a major setback in the 
1930s when the program was first launched, it is evident that the province had learned 
from its mistake making cancer education an absolute necessity. In a 1955 article in the 
Canadian Medical Association Journal entitled “Public Opinion on Cancer in Canada,” 
author A.J. Phillips questioned participants on the symptoms of the disease, the value of 
early diagnosis, curability and the progress that was being made in treatment of cancer. 
The article concluded that Saskatchewan respondents ranked far above the rest of the 
country.223 Even though Phillips’ study was limited, surveying only women in regards to 
cancer of the breast and of the cervix, these findings were still significant in 
demonstrating that a strong educational message about the cancer problem existed in 
Saskatchewan and had resulted in superior success rates. 
The outcome of this commitment to education combined with the provision of 
advanced therapies further solidified Saskatchewan’s image as a leader in combating this 
disease. A 1959 Saskatoon Star Phoenix interview with Dr. A.R. McGee, the President of 
the Canadian Association of Radiologists, described the Saskatchewan endeavor as 
“amongst the best in the world.”224  One of the reasons, according to McGee, for this 
increasing attention stemmed from the development, production and utilization of the 
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world’s first cobalt-60 therapeutic unit.225 Another article in August, 1962 focused on 
how the cancer plan itself was the envy of doctors the world over.  Dr. T.B.C Barclay, a 
member of the Allan Blair Memorial Clinic came to this conclusion after presenting a 
paper at the eighth international cancer congress in Moscow. Reporting on how at least 
ninety percent of all cancer cases were seen or known about by the cancer clinics, these 
numbers were unmatched by any other cancer initiative in the world.226  These findings 
were significant as doctors still promoted that early diagnosis and treatment were the best 
weapons against cancer, and served as a signal to foreign physicians to embark on more 
ambitious programs in their own respective areas.   
Furthermore, the fact that cancer education was leading to earlier diagnosis and 
treatment resulted in Saskatchewan’s cancer cure rate being unequalled in any part of the 
world.227 Referring to cancers commonly treated by radiotherapy, Dr. T. A. Watson 
recorded the vast improvement that Saskatchewan had witnessed since the program’s 
inception to 1963.  With skin cancer treatment almost one hundred percent effective and 
achieving enormous leaps in the success of treating breast and lip cancer, Saskatchewan 
had established itself as “the banner province in Canada” in the fight against cancer.228 
At this point, the Saskatchewan cancer initiative was arguably at its zenith.  In a 
period that pre-dated universal health care the contributions of the provincial and federal 
government proved instrumental to shaping the success of the cancer program in 
Saskatchewan. It is for this reason that the understanding of society, from a Rawlsian  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perspective, as a scheme of cooperation for benefit to all parties involved, including the 
government, provides insight and perspective into the course of the programs 
development. Because what it reveals is that when there are imperatives for parties to 
uphold and adhere to it serves as a template to ensure a fair and just society that is equally 
beneficial to all members of society.  As the government had their own vested interests to 
protect, the outcome of cancer care was as much a desire to protect the goals of the state, 
as it was to provide for its citizens.   
The reason that it is ideal to think of the cancer program in this manner is because 
it suggests that there are a set of self-imposed duties that guide actions and decisions.229 
As a result, decisions not only have a framework to be made within, but furthermore, 
provides a model for objectives to be reconsidered when problems arise.  This is certainly 
true of the federal government’s decision to reconsider its role in producing 
radioisotopes.  Even though Canada had established itself as a major supplier of bulk 
radioisotope products to much of the world by the 1960s, it had to work to ensure that it 
was able to uphold this position.  It did so out of the realization that just as quickly as it 
had established a worldwide market, newer more specific radioisotopes came into 
demand from cancer-treatment clinics in the 1970s that made CPDs products 
antiquated.230 As a result, CPDs revenues flat lined from 1970 to 1975.231 The AECL 
board approved support for a resurgence program to bring CPD back to a favourable 
                                                        229 Note: Rawls frames the morality of actions within a deontological ethic.  The intent 
being to establish that it is not the ends, but rather, the means with which a society should 
be concerned.  In making this distinction, this is another example of Rawls’ departure 
from utilitarian’s.   230 Hurst, 107.   231 Ibid. 
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position that involved turning its focus to the production of molybdenum-99, which had 
come into high demand from researchers and cancer clinics. The shift in production 
yielded substantial profits from 1978 onwards, resulting in a continued respect 
throughout the scientific world, with numerous nations looking to CPD for consultation 
and guidance in the development of their own radioisotope industries.232  
Consequently, the decision to shift production was guided by the desire to 
continue the economic benefit that this industry had provided to Canada.  Considering 
society as a scheme of cooperation for mutual benefit, this example further highlights the 
necessity to renegotiate the terms of social cooperation overtime to ensure that society 
continues to be advantageous to the parties involved.  As this situation resulted in Chalk 
River solidifying its role as a world leader in the production of radioisotopes up until its 
closure in 2009, it suggests that understanding the benefit to the state is not only useful 
for providing historical explanations, but moreover, has contemporary applications as 
well.   
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Conclusion 
 
 By 1966 the province of Saskatchewan had developed a comprehensive cancer 
program that was amongst the best in the world. Saskatchewan achieved this position 
through three integral steps. The first stemmed from the province covering all the costs 
associated with cancer treatment. Second, an aggressive public education campaign about 
the cancer problem encouraged patients to seek medical expertise at the earliest sign of 
cancer. Lastly, Saskatchewan maintained a dedication to providing the most scientific 
and technologically advanced therapies for its citizens, based on a combination of 
international trends and local innovations. In regard to technology, it should not be 
forgotten that the dominion had an important role in supplying the necessary tools, 
radioisotopes, which gave Saskatchewan the opportunity to excel in cancer care. 
Consequently, in this pre-medicare period, Saskatchewan, with support from the 
dominion, had realized the advantages of state involvement in providing health care 
services.   
Yet, in tracing the origin and development of the Saskatchewan cancer program 
over a thirty-year period it becomes apparent that the advantages and benefits of this 
initiative were not simply directed towards the citizens. The reason being, that subsequent 
government’s remained dedicated to improving and expanding on the provision of cancer 
services because this was very much an exercise in forging a strong provincial identity. 
As cancer stimulated fears around the world that it posed a serious threat to the very 
make-up of society, Saskatchewan took the lead in combating this new threat. As the first 
province in Canada to cover the costs associated with treating cancer, while also ensuring 
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that the treatments being provided were of the highest quality, Saskatchewan developed a 
reputation as a leader in health care reforms, and a province dedicated to its citizens’ 
health care needs. 
Building on the notion that there was a reciprocal benefit to the state at the 
provincial level is also helpful for understanding the dominion’s involvement in cancer 
services after the Second World War. As cancer technologies changed, and radioisotopes 
became part of the modern application of cancer treatments, the federal government 
became dedicated to developing a radioisotope industry at Chalk River, Ontario. This 
partnership enabled Saskatchewan to deliver the most sophisticated and modernized 
technology to cancer patients in the world, but it also was spurned by an ulterior motive. 
In particular, the radioisotope industry was driven by a desire to distribute these products 
to an expanding international market so as to ensure a strong and stable economy. This 
mentality ultimately guided the management of radioisotopes in Canada up until the 
closure of the Chalk River’s nuclear reactor in 2009, at which point it was producing 
over a third of the world’s radioisotopes.233 
In highlighting the tremendous, albeit different, benefits at both the provincial and 
federal levels of government, this thesis demonstrates why this relationship was 
ultimately so beneficial to the citizen. Cancer services provided a mutual benefit to both 
the people and the state, and as such, these services offered a guiding model for 
subsequent governments to uphold. The case of cancer care services suggests that the 
multiple layers of government, and several different administrations supported the                                                         
233 “Reactor Idled,” CBC News.    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development of cancer services in a manner that benefitted both the citizen and the state. 
However, the evidence here suggests that the governments involved did not do so 
altruistically. The success achieved through the Saskatchewan cancer endeavor, for both 
the individual and the government, nonetheless implies that having a reciprocal benefit 
for all the parties involved was a necessary condition to achieving a fair and just society. 
Although this argument is predicated on a rather myopic study of the cancer story 
in Saskatchewan, the case of cancer may serve as a model for further examinations of the 
development of provincial cancer programs throughout Canada. Considering that the 
Saskatchewan cancer initiative served as an impetus and model for other provinces to 
replicate it seems appropriate to consider whether this argument provides insight for 
understanding the development of cancer care in other provinces. Of course, it need not 
be the case that other province’s were attempting to build a source of provincial pride as 
Saskatchewan was. Rather, it might have been that for other provinces the development 
of a cancer program was simply an exercise in political expediency as neighboring 
governments did not want their constituents to feel left out of a growing national trend. 
Ultimately, while this assessment of the motivation driving other governments is 
completely speculative, the study here hopes to have provided a framework that is 
applicable for providing perspective on the historical development of additional cancer 
programs across Canada. 
However, in addition to providing a historical perspective on the origins of cancer 
care, the argument that there must be a returned benefit to the state is also relevant for 
understanding the contemporary condition of cancer services.  It is all the more important 
to examine the current state of affairs given that the cancer situation in Canada is far from 
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ideal.  Society is littered with cancer reminders such as Lance Armstrong’s “Livestrong,” 
breast cancer’s “Run for the Cure,” and prostate cancer’s “Movember November,” but 
remarkably, in spite of its publicity, cancer remains the leading cause of death in Canada. 
With more than sixty-eight thousand deaths occurring every year from cancer and more 
than 2,800 Canadians diagnosed with the disease every week it suggests that the war on 
cancer is far from being won.234 The significance of these statistics is further compounded 
by the fact that more than sixty-five percent of all Canadian cancer patients are on 
waiting lists to receive radiation therapy. 235 These delays were only exacerbated in 2009 
when Canada’s nuclear reactor in Chalk River was forced to shut down due to safety 
concerns.236 
As Canada maintained its position in distributing radioisotopes globally for more 
than fifty years it is clear that up until the closure of the nuclear reactor, this industry 
continued to provide an economic return for the state.  Yet, given the current 
inadequacies with the system in providing timely and coordinated care, the same 
continued success cannot be said of cancer services today.  The contemporary situation 
indicates a major departure from the conditions that led to a successful cancer program in 
Saskatchewan for more than thirty years.  As the current situation suggests that we are no 
longer a society adhering to the framework of a cooperative venture for mutual benefit.  
Considering how the notion of reciprocal benefit has provided insight into 
Saskatchewan’s cancer success in the past, the hope here is that the same idea has some 
value for providing perspective on the current cancer condition.  The overarching                                                         234 Hayter, Element of Hope, 3. 235 Ibid.  236 “Reactor Idled,” CBC News.   
  
81 
argument helps to explain not only where the program has failed, but moreover, how it 
might be improved. As historians like Robert Proctor, Ilana Löwy and Devra Davis have 
turned their attention to studying the detrimental effect that politics has had in limiting 
the progress against cancer, an investigation into the causative factors of the current 
problems with cancer care in Canada would be in keeping with the developing 
historiography and an ideal avenue for further scholarship.237  This thesis offers one small 
step in that historiographical direction with a concentration on providing the political 
background in the pioneering model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         237 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